I do not claim a monopoly of wisdom on the precise wording, but it is important to go back to the case law—London Borough of Bromley v. the SEN tribunal in 1999, in which Lord Justice Sedley stated:
“Special educational provision is, in principle, whatever is called for by a child’s learning difficulty,”
which he goes on to define. He states:
“What is special about special educational provision is that it is additional to or different from ordinary educational provision”.
In that phrase, we have a more fundamental definition. Provision is not what is significant, but whatever is necessary. I am grateful to my hon. Friend for looking at that. My hon. Friend the Minister is listening carefully. Either in this House or in the other place, we need to achieve clarity and a replication of the words of the Lord Justice of Appeal, so that we do not end up moving away from the Government’s clearly stated intention.