I am extremely grateful to my hon. Friend for his kind remarks. He makes an important point about a common entry point for families. That is
a good start, but more needs to be done to build on it. To be frank, it may not be necessary to do that through primary legislation and the rules of the tribunals might be used. That would be a matter for Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service. I know my hon. Friend is liaising with counterparts in the Ministry of Justice on other matters that I shall come on to, and I sure he will also give this issue careful and anxious thought.
At the moment, clause 50(4)(a) allows
“other matters relating to EHC plans against which appeals may be brought;”
to be added to the jurisdiction of the tribunal. To be fair to my hon. Friend, there does seem to be a power within the Bill, but it would be wise to go just one furlong further and make it absolutely clear to the families we represent that simplicity is the order of the day when it comes to people’s rights to challenge decisions that—let us not forget this—will affect the life course of the young people we are dealing with.
Let me move on to a rather interesting—well, I hope so—and important matter. Having to admit to being a lawyer is not popular in this House, but words are important and if we change the meaning of something, once again the lawyers will jump all over it. In that spirit, let us consider amendment 39, which relates to the position of current case law, and the synthesis between health care provision, social care provision and education—a point that returns to the comments made by my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud (Neil Carmichael). The Government’s intention seems clear: they wish to replicate current case law when it comes to how local authorities judge their responsibility to make provision in that area. Clause 21 includes the words
“wholly or mainly for the purposes of education”,
and I share the concern that the words “wholly or mainly” set a different and higher threshold than is currently set out in case law. In the 1999 Bromley case, Lord Justice Sedley spoke about a case-by-case analysis of particular applications, rather than a general principle as seems to be suggested by the clause. We should therefore consider a spectrum or range of provision from purely medical to purely educational need. A large number of cases will fall inside that spectrum, bearing in mind the common and well-understood scenario that with a particular need often comes a co-morbid need—a special educational need will often be accompanied by a health need as well.