The hon. Gentleman asks a fascinating and timely question, one which deserves a proper answer. He may have misheard me, because when I said “global turnover” what I actually meant was UK turnover. Nevertheless, that is clearly a very significant amount.
Our approach would allow for a relatively straightforward resolution of relatively simple cases. Accepting amendments to remove the cap would require us to make changes to the appeal mechanism, which could deny consumers access to the timely compensation they are due, as it could result in a far lengthier resolution of cases if the stakes are much higher. In considering whether such a trade-off is justifiable, we should take into account just how unlikely it would be for consumers to lose out on
this scale. Exceeding a 10% cap of annual turnover would mean penalties and compensation of over a £1 billion for the very largest domestic energy supplier. The largest penalty imposed to date by Ofgem has been £15 million and under our legislation the cap for the largest would be set at £1 billion. A cap on redress is therefore unlikely to hinder Ofgem’s ability to impose appropriate redress orders.
In addition, there are unintended consequences of removing the 10% cap on penalty and redress, as that could also increase the costs of capital and insurance premiums for energy companies. Again, that would particularly affect the smaller companies—the very ones we are trying to attract into the sector—with all the adverse impacts on consumer bills that I mentioned earlier.
Energy companies should be in no doubt, however, that these powers are designed to ensure that consumers receive appropriate compensation. The combined 10% cap on penalties and redress will apply to each separate regulatory breach. If companies flout the rules on a number of occasions, they will therefore face correspondingly larger payouts. For the reasons I have set out, I hope that hon. Members will, on balance, agree not to press their amendments to a Division.