Directors’ pay has been very much in the news recently, for reasons that the hon. Member for Hartlepool (Mr Wright) has outlined. Between 1998 and 2000, the average total remuneration of FTSE 100 chief executive officers increased fourfold, which was much faster than the increase in prices or in average remuneration levels across other employers. It was also much faster than the increase in the FTSE 100 itself. There was clearly an issue to be addressed, and the Government opened up the debate on directors’ pay a year ago. We drew attention to the fact that top pay in large public companies had grown rapidly without any clear connection to performance, and we asked what could be done about it. We encouraged business and investors to face up to this difficult issue.
In January, the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State committed to taking action, and in June we introduced bold measures into this Bill. I know that the Bill Committee enjoyed a thorough and engaging debate on this issue before the summer break, and I am pleased that our reforms have received such wide support inside and outside Parliament. Investors agree that this comprehensive package of reforms will help them to tackle excessive pay and to restore a clearer link between pay and long-term performance.
We have tabled six minor and technical amendments to the clauses on directors’ remuneration, which I will outline before I speak briefly in response to the other amendments that have been tabled. The technical amendments will tighten up the legislation and ensure that it is as robust and clear as possible. Business and investors support those amendments. Amendments 25 and 30 correct a technical drafting oversight. They clarify that, for the purpose of identifying when companies will be affected by the new provisions, the relevant financial year is the one beginning on or after the day on which the provisions come into force. That is to ensure that companies whose year starts on 1 October are subject to the provisions.
Amendments 26 and 29 make it clear that the definition of “quoted company” shall be the same as that which already appears in the Companies Act 2006. Amendment 27 broadens the definition of what is meant by a remuneration payment so that remuneration paid to a director in his or her capacity as an executive manager of the company or its subsidiary is also captured. Importantly, that will mean that companies cannot circumvent the new restrictions by paying someone a small fee for being a director and a large salary for being a manager.
Amendment 28 tightens up the provisions relating to payments made to former directors. This will ensure that, where former directors are allowed to benefit from long-term pay schemes that mature after they have left, the payments must be consistent with the company’s remuneration policy—and if not, approved by a separate shareholder resolution. I am sure the House will agree that these minor and technical amendments will strengthen and improve the legislation, and I hope all Members will join me in supporting them.
Opposition Members have suggested a number of areas where they would like the legislation to go further, but for the reasons that my predecessor, my hon. Friend the Member for North Norfolk (Norman Lamb) made clear in Committee, the Government do not agree that the amendments are necessary. I shall explain why.
Amendment 86 proposes that the binding vote on remuneration policy occurs annually, even if a company’s policy has not changed. The hon. Member for Hartlepool set out various objections to the provisions, saying that they were too onerous and inappropriate. We went for a three-year pay policy and, to be fair, this had nothing to do with being onerous; it was about what investors said would work. The attraction of a three-year policy is that it encourages more long-term thinking and discourages the kind of unnecessary annual tinkering that invariably leads to pay going up and getting ever more complex. That approach is backed by major investors and investor bodies such as the Association of British Insurers. Of course, there is nothing to stop companies from having an annual vote on pay policy—they have the flexibility to do so—and there is the safety net of a trigger mechanism to protect shareholders. If they are unhappy with how the pay policy is working out and they reject the annual advisory vote, a binding vote on policy at the next annual general meeting will be triggered.
The hon. Member for Hartlepool asked whether the policy will be too vague and too high-level, but the regulations that inform what happens will clearly and succinctly set out to which types of payments directors are entitled, how the pay links to company strategy, how performance will be assessed and how it will translate into awards under different scenarios. Parliament will have a chance separately to debate the regulations at a later stage. If there were any outstanding concerns, they could be put forward then.
Amendments 95 and 96 would make the vote on remuneration a special resolution, requiring 75% shareholder support to pass. Investors have made it very clear that they want an ordinary resolution, subject to a simple majority. It is important to note that we have seen this year that it is absolutely possible for the majority of shareholders to vote against pay proposals. So far this year, seven companies have lost their pay votes—real evidence that the process can work.
Amendment 93 would require companies to consult an employee representative whenever they wish to propose a revised remuneration policy. I am sympathetic to the intention of encouraging employees to be involved and consulted. We share the view that it is helpful for remuneration committees to seek employees’ views on pay—indeed, some already do—and we are encouraging them to report on how they have taken employee views and employee pay into account. I do not believe that the statutory approach set out in the amendment is the right way forward. It is worth reminding the House of the consultation that closed in September, as the Government will shortly come forward with their response. We proposed that companies should report on whether they sought the views of the work force in setting pay. There are also existing tools such as information and consultation arrangements, which can be used to make sure that employees are engaged. The Government definitely sympathise with the spirit of that intention, but we do not think that the statutory approach provides the right way forward.
Finally, the Opposition’s new clause 27 would allow the Secretary of State to make new regulations requiring companies to disclose how remuneration and recruitment consultants are paid. We do not accept the provision because the Secretary of State already has the power to require that to be part of the director’s remuneration
report. We have already published draft regulations to implement that, whereby companies will have to explain how consultants have been appointed, used and remunerated.
I hope that I have provided some assurance on these matters. I thank hon. Members for engaging in the issues, but maintain that the proposed amendments—other than the Government amendments—are unnecessary, so we shall not support them.
Question put, That the amendment be made: