As I have said, this is a new measure and these are the figures we have put in place. I do not know what figures the hon. Lady thinks should be set. It is important that there is some certainty for businesses and so, after progressing with this measure and putting it in place, we can then review it and see how it works. By ensuring that the specific amount is not set in primary legislation, we will have the ability to amend it through secondary legislation, which will give the required flexibility. Amendments 72 and 83 would undermine the objectives of the financial penalty regime and so I am unable to accept them.
The final amendment to clause 14, amendment 73, tabled by the hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington, seeks to specify the purpose for which any moneys accruing to the Exchequer from the imposition of financial penalties should be used. Hon. Members will know that the Government already fund the activities to which the amendment refers through ACAS, with an annual grant in aid allocation of about £45 million a year. As my predecessor made clear in Committee, the purpose of the financial penalty is not to raise revenue for the Exchequer. It would not be appropriate to expect ACAS to function with some element of its annual funding being dependent on what is ultimately a discretionary decision by a tribunal. The existing mechanism for funding ACAS is the right one, so I am unable to accept the amendment.
Amendment 94 seeks to address a point we covered in Committee. I understand that its aim is to prevent a disclosure relating to a breach of a private contract from being a qualifying disclosure for the purposes of a whistleblowing claim, unless it is clearly in the public interest. My predecessor, my hon. Friend the Member for North Norfolk, explained in Committee our reasons for not wanting to take that route. We believe that such an approach would have the potential for unintended consequences and would not in itself address the concerns raised by the Parkins v. Sodexho decision. For example, the issue in that case could have been reframed as a
health and safety issue, with similar issues then arising in relation to the disclosures of minor breaches of health and safety legislation, which are of no interest to the wider public. Not only are we closing the loophole identified in the Parkins v. Sodexho case, but by introducing the public interest test we are removing the potential for the opportunistic use of the protection. That will prevent any cases similar to the Parkins v. Sodexho case in the areas that would otherwise be uncovered by the amendment.