I will in due course, but I want to make a bit of progress first.
I welcome this opportunity to set out the changes that we have proposed and respond to those made by others, continuing the work of my predecessor to bring reform to the employment tribunal system. Let me begin by explaining the amendments that we are making through new clause 8, which will amend existing provisions in the Employment Tribunals Act 1996.
Following his fundamental review of the rules of procedure for employment tribunals, Mr Justice Underhill made a number of recommendations about how the rules might be improved. In some instances, he felt that the primary legislation would need to be amended before desirable changes in the procedural rules could be made. These changes will help to achieve more effective and targeted case management which will benefit all tribunal users.
The first change involves deposit orders. Tribunals can currently require a party to pay a deposit of up to £1,000 as a condition of continuing to proceed with a weak claim. However, a judge cannot currently use a deposit order to weed out the weak elements of a particular claim, and must instead attach a deposit order to the entire claim as a condition of proceeding. That lack of flexibility does not aid effective case
management. Enabling judges to make better-targeted deposit orders will give both parties a clear sense of where they should focus their efforts, encouraging a more realistic approach to settlement, and I believe that it will also lead to greater use of such orders.
The second change relates to the recoverability of witness expenses for people who choose to represent themselves at tribunals and seek a preparation time order in respect of their work on the case. An oddity in the current costs regime places people who represent themselves at tribunals at a disadvantage, as a tribunal cannot make a costs order for witness expenses and a preparation time order in respect of the same party. We are amending the Employment Tribunals Act 1996 to remove that unnecessary restriction.
The final change deals with the recoverability of lay representatives’ costs. Mr Justice Underhill considered that those who chose to be represented by a non-lawyer, and who had paid for that service and advice, should not be put at a disadvantage when a tribunal concluded that the other party’s conduct meant that a costs order was warranted. I agree that those who choose to engage lay representatives rather than lawyers should not be disadvantaged when it comes to the award of costs, and I intend to use the existing powers in section 13 of the Employment Tribunals Act to change the rules of procedure in order to allow for such costs orders. The new clause helps to clarify the scope of section 13 by introducing a definition of the word “representative”.
Let me now deal with new clauses 1 and 2, tabled by the hon. Member for North Ayrshire and Arran (Katy Clark), which amend clause 15. Along with the organisation Public Concern at Work, she has been a powerful advocate on this subject, and we discussed it recently during a Westminster Hall debate that she had initiated.
I think we can all agree that, in an ideal world, legislation for whistleblowing would not be needed at all. In such a world, all employers would be open and receptive when an issue was raised, and would not seek to silence or drive out a person who brought important matters to their attention. However, as we know, such enlightened approaches to whistleblowing are not universal, so legal protection is required. We are equally keen to ensure that the protection offered by the public interest disclosure legislation is not abused by those who seek to rely on it for purely self-interested reasons. Clause 15, which has already been debated in Committee, will ensure that the whistleblowing provisions cannot be used to advance purely personal interests.
New clause 1 addresses a different aspect of the public interest disclosure legislation. It proposes the removal of the good faith test, which has been in place since the legislation was introduced. That would mean that individual whistleblowers would retain the benefit of employment protection even if their reasons for blowing the whistle were malicious, if they deliberately set out to cause commercial damage, or if they acted out of a desire for personal revenge.
There is clearly a balance to be struck. We are conscious of the recommendations of Dame Janet Smith’s inquiry into the tragic circumstances of the Shipman case. She suggested that the good faith test be removed to encourage more whistleblowers to come forward. We also recognise that the motivations of whistleblowers are not always clear-cut. Personal feelings, particularly when a relationship has broken down, sometimes make it difficult to understand
the intentions of the person who is making a disclosure. Having said that, I should add that, as we have already made clear, we believe that the legislation is working well overall, and that the good faith test serves an important purpose.
We are also keen to avoid making a change that could allow individuals access to an uncapped award when their motives for blowing the whistle were malicious, and I therefore do not believe that there is a clear-cut case for removing the good faith test. However, I recognise that the hon. Lady has raised an important issue relating to this specific element of the public interest disclosure regime, and we will continue to look closely at the policy aims of the test to ensure that they are still being achieved.