Protection of Freedoms Bill

My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister for the explanation this evening and for the letter that she kindly sent me following Committee. These are complex issues. I hope that she will forgive me if I am asking questions that she has already answered. Essentially, to introduce a new definition of ““vulnerable”” complicates the issue in many ways. Although I hear what she says—that this definition is imported from another criminal justice Act—it is not the tried and tested definition of ““vulnerable”” and it would be far easier if people knew exactly where they stood. I still have serious concerns about the appropriateness of the new definition. As the noble Baroness said, in Committee, I disagreed with the restrictions that the Government placed on the retention of DNA data from those arrested for but not charged with a serious offence. That is a misleading distinction which has serious consequences for victims of crime with historically low charge rates, such as rape. As stated in the letter, the Government recognise that vulnerable members of society should be given special protection in such situations, and new Section 63G aims to provide for the retention of DNA data for those arrested for offences against victims deemed to be vulnerable adults. At Second Reading in the Commons, the Home Secretary, the right honourable Theresa May, stated, on the conditions where new Section 63F(5) would apply: "““I would expect that application to be made in certain circumstances, such as when the victim has been vulnerable, which may mean there is very good evidence that the individual concerned has committed a crime but the victim is not able or not willing to come forward and see that case through””.—[Official Report, Commons, 1/3/11; col. 206.]" However, the Government’s proposed amendment to the definition of vulnerable adult recognises only those individuals who are subject to mental or physical impairment as being particularly vulnerable to problems in bringing forward a charge of providing evidence. In particular, the new definition requires that an individual’s ability to protect himself or herself from violence, abuse or neglect is significantly impaired. The definition, particularly with the addition of the qualification ““significantly””, adds a large element of discretion, leaving judgment of the vulnerability of the victim up to the discretion of the officer dealing with the case. I am concerned that such a definition is open to wide interpretation, which may mean that vulnerable adults are not given sufficient protection under the Bill. An individual’s circumstances are a key indicator of their vulnerability, as is recognised by the definition used under Section 60(1) of the Safeguarding of Vulnerable Groups Act 2006, which lists a number of different circumstances in which an adult should be classed as vulnerable. The proposed new definition also neglects the fact that the type of offence will often determine the particular vulnerability of the individual and lead to problems which may account for the lack of any charge being made. I note that the noble Baroness says that women who have been subjected to violence are covered under a different clause, although they are not covered by the definition of ““vulnerable””. I am glad that that is the case, but it is complicated. They cannot read the Bill and see that they are covered as being vulnerable. I will not press the amendment to a vote, but there are still questions to be answered. I do not expect the noble Baroness to answer me this evening, but if we could have further discussion about this to sort out some of my remaining concerns I would be extremely grateful.