UK Parliament / Open data

Health and Social Care Bill

My Lords, I wish to draw attention to Clause 72(1)(b), which refers to, "““a power to investigate on its own initiative whether the National Health Service Commissioning Board or a clinical commissioning group has failed to comply with a requirement imposed by virtue of section 71(1)(c)””—" which we discussed earlier, the provision to, "““not engage in anti-competitive behaviour which is against the interests of people who use such services””." I had understood that the decision not to have competition as one of the main functions of Monitor was a considered political decision, but the more one looks at Clause 71(1)(c), and now at Clause 72(1)(b), the more one realises that this has been got round, effectively, by ensuring that anti-competitiveness becomes a prime responsibility of Monitor. There are a number of objections to this. The noble Lord, Lord Whitty, put his finger on it, that a good regulator does not also become a policeman in an anti sense to the people he is trying to regulate. There is a deep question as to whether you really want a situation where Monitor can be set against the National Health Service Commissioning Board and the commissioning groups. I am very doubtful that this is a sensible power to give to Monitor. I know it is regulating the whole group, but if you look at the way Monitor is approaching its tasks, time and again it is going to be reliant on good will and an atmosphere of trust between Monitor, the NHS Commissioning Board and the commissioning groups, and now there is this question of anti-competitiveness. It is not as if nobody else is going to be looking at anti-competitive behaviour of the National Health Service Commissioning Board. The private sector wants to go into this whole area and will be looking very carefully at whether or not it is being given an even playing field. It will be taking, and threatening to take, the Commissioning Board to law—I am not even raising the issue of EU legislation, but just under British legislation. I do not think it is fair to argue that there is unlimited freedom for the National Health Service Commissioning Board or the commissioning groups to operate in this area, particularly the board. You are really setting yourself up for a very difficult situation. Also, to do it ““on its own initiative””—does that mean Monitor would not consult the board or a clinical commissioning group but just suddenly involve itself in an investigation? I would be grateful if the Minister could give some indication of how he sees this in practice. Will some guidance be given not to develop an adversarial relationship? It is very easy for animosities to start coming in to this area. As I say, it is not as if it is free from legal challenge. Their actions can be challenged. However, for another NHS body to be able to question the judgment of the Commissioning Board that in this particular case it is best not to put something out to competitive tender, or to make a judgment when it has been done because somebody feels that it is anti-competitive, is a really dangerous power. In the wrong circumstances, where Monitor might be chaired by somebody who is getting into a bad relationship with the NHS Commissioning Board chairman, something not totally unknown in these areas, this is a tool which could be used in a destructive and adversarial fashion. It would be very helpful, for future occasions, to hear from the Minister as to how he thinks this would actually work out in real life.

About this proceeding contribution

Reference

733 c1239-40 

Session

2010-12

Chamber / Committee

House of Lords chamber
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