European Union Bill

What parties put in their manifestos is certainly not within my control or that of anyone else in Parliament. The parties can make their own decisions. I respect very much what my noble friend and her colleagues are saying and the nature of their amendment, and I want to consider it in considerable detail in the time left. I consider that a very important thing to do. I was just saying that if the pattern I have described is the right one, the measure would be a retrograde step in an age when the British people have come to expect more of a say than ever before in a wider range of issues. We might not like it, but that is the reality. That applies not just to the British people, of course, but to electorates throughout the entire planet, of which one-third are now on the worldwide web with their linkages and networks expressing their views. Therefore, this measure would do nothing whatever in our view to help to demonstrate to the British people why our continued membership of the European Union is in the interests of everyone in this country and in our national interest. That is something in which this Government believe, although it is not a view that is shared by all noble Lords. We would be taking power away not only from the British people but from Parliament, because what this Bill does in part, as the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, and others have reminded us, is to enhance the power both of Parliament and the people. We would be promising Parliament more control over decisions taken by the Government at the EU level only to take it away again. Weakening parliamentary control in this way would run contrary to the key principle of the Bill. That principle, incidentally, has been welcomed by the Constitution Committee of this House and by a number of noble Lords in debate. The noble Lord, Lord Taverne, spoke with great fluency and feeling on whether the Bill binds future Parliaments. Given his remarkable career, he has been at the centre of how the EU should develop and how Britain should work within it, so I totally respect his comments. However, this Bill does not attempt to bind future Parliaments. That is not its intention and it is not the way in which it works. It is open to this and to future Parliaments to repeal, disapply or amend this legislation, once it has been enacted, as Parliament can do with all legislation. The Bill does not alter this fundamental tenet of parliamentary sovereignty, and nor should it. I pray in aid here an interesting remark of Edward Short, a man for whom I had great admiration although he was not on my side politically. When he was Leader of the House of Commons, he said during consideration of the Referendum Act 1975, which my noble and learned friend Lord Howe remembers so well: "““Although one would not expect hon. Members to go against the wishes of the people, they will remain free to do so””.—[Official Report, Commons, 11/3/1975; col. 293.]" Rather than binding future Parliaments, this Bill is an attempt to engage and guide this and future Governments—not Parliaments—and to bind them to seek the views of Parliament, and where necessary the British people, before signing up to any further transfers of power over and above the powers and competences that the European Union has. I have argued throughout Committee that those powers and competences are ample—some would say they are more than ample—to perform all the tasks that we want to see performed in the upgrading, development and strengthening of the European Union as it adjusts to 21st century conditions. It is our wish and our intention that this Bill should become a settled part of this country’s constitutional furniture. If people say, ““You should not say that””, my answer is that any Government wish to see their architecture—their longer-term aims and hopes—last into the future and be adopted by the next Government. One makes no secret of the fact that where we are talking about architecture rather than a one-off task, it is natural that we should want the following Government to pursue it. I recall being a member of a Government some decades ago who promoted the dreaded phrase ““privatisation””. In fact, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Howe, did me the honour of suggesting that I had invented that word, adding that it was a particularly ugly one and everyone wanted to get rid of it. However, privatisation came in with a range of laws. We hoped and prayed then that successor Governments would not repeal those laws and renationalise everything. Our hopes were fulfilled. The successor Governments to the Conservative Governments of those days kept the balance of the private and public sectors; indeed, they enlarged the private sector. We did not say that we would bind the next Government; we merely hoped that that architecture would stay in place. It did, and exactly the same issues apply now. I made the point a moment ago that the Bill seeks to bind future Governments. All Governments, when they put long-term measures in place, do not want to see future Governments just chuck them out. This Government said in the coalition agreement that they would not agree to any further transfer of competence or power from the UK to the EU in this Parliament, nor do they intend to do so. We think that the European Union has enough competences and powers and we see no great need or pressure for expansion or for the flexibility about which the noble Lord spoke from the opposition Front Bench. Of course, the Bill, from the very moment it becomes an Act—if it does—applies to this Government as much as to future Governments; I cannot see anyone suggesting otherwise. Any treaty change would still need a statement from the Government and an Act of Parliament; any passerelle would still require parliamentary approval. It may be—for nothing is certain in the future—that for whatever reason, however unlikely it is and however much it goes against our firm coalition commitment, a need emerges to agree some great treaty change that would transfer competence or power during this Parliament. As the noble Lord, Lord Taverne, said, we cannot be sure. That is all the more reason for having this Bill in place. If such things appear, and if they fulfil the conditions described in the Bill and relate to very serious issues—I think noble Lords underestimate how serious many of these issues are, particularly those listed in Schedule 1—there would be a referendum. That makes it all the more important that the Bill be in place, to govern, reinforce and consolidate the political commitment of this Government with a legal undertaking, and we hope to guide future Governments along exactly the same path. Your Lordships are of course aware that this Government have a policy to ensure that, where new regulations on businesses can have a time limit put on them, then they should. That is quite different; that is for a specific operational reason—to ensure that businesses are not overburdened by bureaucracy. There are other areas where the sunset idea is valid. The Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 allowed for an annual review of extended detention periods for terrorist suspects. There was good reason for that, since severe forms of control order require a derogation from Article 5 of European Convention on Human Rights legislation before they can be implemented. More recently, the Public Bodies Bill contains a sunset clause—which has been described as a ““use it or lose it”” clause and makes perfectly good sense—to allow a fixed time for the Government to introduce desired reforms through provisions that would then expire. The noble Lord, Lord Kerr, raised the question of the sunset amendment to the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill—that was not a government amendment but was inserted by your Lordships in their wisdom. As was explained in the debate, one can see perfectly well why. The coalition exists, and I hope that it continues to exist in strong fine form during this fixed-term Parliament, but after that we have a new landscape. Who knows who will govern? Who knows what the pattern will be? It made perfectly good sense for that legislation to have a limited life before coming to be re-examined. These examples and others have been in cases where power has been given to the Executive on a given issue for a given period of time. The contrast with this Bill is total. This Bill seeks to devolve power from the Executive to Parliament and the British people. I am afraid that the amendments would take away that devolving effect and, in effect, give it back to the Executive. As my noble friend Lady Nicholson said, matters would again be left purely in the hands of Ministers. Furthermore, and I say this particularly to my noble friends who suggested that in Amendment 64 one might have a middle way—a little bit of sunsetting, but not too much—a system of post-legislative scrutiny is in place for all legislation, not just the legislation before us today. If people are surprised to learn that, I tell them that in March 2008—this is an inheritance from the previous Government—Ministers put in place a systematic process whereby, between three and five years following Royal Assent to an Act, the Government must submit a memorandum to the relevant departmental Select Committee comprising an assessment of the operation of the Act relative to the objectives of the legislation. The relevant committee can then decide whether it wishes to conduct a more extensive scrutiny of the operation of that Act. That is what will happen anyway. I think that noble Lords will agree that it is a bit of a contrast to the idea in Amendment 64 that if the Bill expired at a certain time, new legislation would be needed to restore the role of Parliament, and would take it back even to the 2008 position, let alone the position that I think all parties want today. Such matters will still be decided by Ministers. Although I can see that the amendment is meant to be a pragmatic solution, it would not actually solve—in fact it would dissolve—the requirement for more trust. Our sincere hope in government is that future Governments will not cut the cord of returning trust, which the Bill provides for, and that they will not take this step back in time to the age of suspicion over the European Union and its direction that we knew in the past. There is nothing in this legislation that binds Parliament, because one cannot do that. I have outlined powerful reasons for the Bill—not least the need to meet effectively the legitimate expectations of the British people for a say in whether or not to transfer further powers to the European Union, which is not necessary at all at the moment; and not least the need to align our country with the movement throughout Europe for a greater democratic say by the people. That is an attitude that my honourable friend the Minister for Europe has encountered as he has visited every Government and talked to a vast range of Ministers and public opinion formers throughout all member states. He has never found the ideas and proposals of the coalition in the Bill any problem at all. I say that to the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, who suggested that I should do a bit more travelling. I should quite like to do a bit of travelling, but my duties nowadays frequently seem to be here. Perhaps I will be released over the next few days for a little travelling. Indeed, I intend to head off to the Middle East almost as soon as these debates are over. Those are the reasons why, with the best will in the world, the idea of sunsetting or expiring legislation that can be renewed in some way by a future Secretary of State does not belong to this kind of legislation. This legislation is intended to be the architecture for a better and more settled relationship between this country and the European Union, by our exertions, and one hopes in the European Union generally, by our example. That is the possibility of the future. It does not to any degree tie Ministers’ hands in the way that has been dramatically asserted, just as the negotiating positions of other Ministers in other countries with similar restrictions—sometimes by referenda or complicated mandates agreed with other parties in their Parliaments—are not tied but strengthened. All of that is a fear of hobgoblins that I suggest my noble friends should dismiss. There is nothing in this that weakens our position, but there is a great deal that strengthens it. There is a great deal of hope for the future in better and settled relationships with the European Union, with popular support. That is why, for the time being and as an enduring fact, I have to say that sunset clauses do not, alas, fit the purpose of the Bill. I ask the noble Lords who have suggested them to withdraw them.