European Union Bill

My Lords, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Williamson, on his summing up of Schedule 1 from where he stands. As noble Lords will be aware, there are very much opposing amendments within the amendments that have been grouped together for Schedule 1. I have tabled Amendment 47A, which is really at the other side of the table from Amendments 45, 46 and 47, which I do not support. Amendments 45 and 47 seek to remove JHA vetoes, including on police co-operation and the EPP and the veto on the appointment of judges, which I would argue are precisely the type of treaty changes that would extend competence from the UK to the EU in sensitive areas and which actually warrant a referendum. Amendment 46 removes all vetoes in TFEU from the referendum lock covering sensitive areas such as social security, social policy, employment policy, justice, home affairs and some tax and defence issues. Amendment 47A, to which I am speaking, raises a further area of potential transfer of powers from the UK to the EU and proposes the requirement for a referendum which has not been included in the Bill. This is really an illustration that the Bill has not, as some have argued, covered every conceivable territory of transfer of powers but aims to pitch the requirement for a referendum on what the Government perceive as major red line areas. As noble Lords will be aware, few aspects of trade agreements are now subject to unanimity post-Lisbon. The norm is now a majority. Amendment 47A would subject to a referendum an amending treaty or Article 48(7) TEU ratchet decision, which abolished the veto over negotiation and conclusion of EU trade agreements with non-EU countries and international organisations in the three main areas that were exemptions in Lisbon and covered sensitive issues and thus remained subject to unanimity. First there are the agreements which cover trade in services, the commercial aspects of intellectual property or foreign direct investment, where the agreements include provisions for which unanimity would be required for the adoption of equivalent internal EU rules. That is the most important of the three. Secondly, there are the agreements covering trade in cultural or audiovisual services that, "““risk prejudicing the Union’s cultural and linguistic diversity””." Thirdly, there are agreements covering trade and social, education or health services that risk seriously disrupting the national organisation of such services and prejudicing the responsibility of member states to deliver them. EU international trade agreements are binding on member states. The removal of the national veto in some or all of these areas would represent a transfer of power from the UK to the EU in politically sensitive and economically important territories.