European Union Bill

I can make the oversimple point that referenda have been used rather frequently, including by the previous Government and from the days of Harold Wilson onwards, as we heard. They have been used in this country and increasingly in other countries far more frequently than here. There is a more general point behind my noble friend’s intervention which is that we now live in the internet age. We live in an era in which people still admire, despite its many faults, and still support the principle of parliamentary government, as I most certainly do. There is a constant pressure for wider consultation and empowerment. Sixty-three per cent of people in this country are on the web every morning. People want a say. There is greater pressure coming for referenda. We heard from my noble friend Lord Deben that he does not like referenda. I think that several of my noble friends do not and I suspect that many throughout your Lordships’ House are not very happy about referenda. It is a question of balance and the balance has shifted. The shift is in the direction of a greater demand that fundamentally important issues, five of which I have just outlined—not one, but five—should be put to referenda. I want to come in particular to the other items in Clause 6. There are six very important areas where noble Lords ask why they are there as they are issues that if decisions gave rise to treaty changes, they would be caught under Clauses 2 and 3. They are in Clause 6 because under the passerelle provisions, on which the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, is undoubtedly the leading expert, vetoes could be given up in those areas as well. The Government believe that the surrender of those vetoes would be transfers of power and that again there needs to be fundamental reassurance under this Bill and the beginnings of some kind of reconnection and support that there will be no further extensive and sometimes rather furtive concessions of powers and competences. We believe that these two should not be barred. The passerelle system should not be barred in any way, but if we look on it as a possible window for quicker procedures—I would question the quickness, incidentally, as I have some figures showing that it is very far from being quick—nevertheless one should put a lock on that window. That is all we are saying. We are not saying that the passerelle system should not be used but that there should be a lock to ensure that it does not provide the opportunity for power and competences to seep away. I add the point about the length of time taken. Passerelles are not the quick fix that some people suggest. In all the cases that one looks at about the future—of course, there is very little to look at in the past as most of these passerelles have never been used, which is for good reason—the evidence is that they would take six months or a year. They would have to clog up national Parliaments and would not be the easy way of getting round the issue of giving up vetoes. In that sort of scenario I very much doubt that the British people would understand why they would be asked for their views on whether or not to give up the British veto on, for instance, common foreign and security policy by virtue of a treaty change but be not asked for their say before the British Government could do exactly the same thing through the passerelle procedure. That is why there is concern and why these matters are in Clause 6. I mentioned common foreign and security policy but there is a whole social policy area where there are very serious issues and the surrender of a veto would be a major surrender of power. The environment passerelle has been there since 1987. It has never been used, for the very good reason that countries do not want to use it because it takes time, is complicated and blocks up national parliamentary procedures throughout the European Union. The European Union's multiannual financial frameworks, introduced by the Lisbon treaty, are neither unimportant nor casual. They are highly important and giving up the veto over them would be a considerable departure and concession of power. The remaining vetoes concern not enhanced co-operation itself—which does not affect competence at all because it is not allowed to—but situations where, once we were in an enhanced co-operation operation, there might be pressure for it to go to QMV. All these areas are vital, not trivial. They are critical areas, in the language of the noble Lord, Lord Triesman, and there must be reassurance that they will not be, by a tick of a box, by launching into a long and complicated treaty procedure, or even by an Act of Parliament, simply turned into major concessions of power and competence. I have not begun to answer every question and I will be happy to write to noble Lords about some of the very interesting amendments they tabled. I have in mind in particular the observations of my noble friend Lord Flight. As he said, they did not quite fit into the main thrust of many amendments from noble Lords opposite, but they were very interesting and raised important issues. We have debated these matters very thoroughly and I will end by saying this. If one believes that the EU has enough competences and powers to proceed and to succeed, and that this is the context in which the UK can take the lead; that, far from being marginalised, we can continue to shape and be decisive in the European Union; and if one recognises that other countries are just as opposed to QMV and the moot case of passerelles—I mentioned Sweden, Spain, Ireland and Estonia, and there could be many others—one will see the case for the Bill. If noble Lords believe that all members of the EU are itching to bring forward new treaties, take new powers and extend competences, despite the fact that that would be a very slow and unpopular process in many countries and would clog up 27 national Parliaments, they will obviously disagree and there is nothing that I can do to persuade them otherwise. If that is the way they see the future of Europe, and the future development of a successful and popular European Union that attracts and merits the public consensus in a way that it is not doing today, clearly they will also see the prospect of an endless treaty trickle that in my view would be a major contribution not to encouraging trust and support for a successful European Union but to undermining it. To noble Lords who insist on that view, there is nothing more than I can say, except that, in the view of the Government, such a procedure in future—a pattern that would come up against the proposals in the Bill if there were endless treaty changes appearing at all times—would be guaranteed to alienate people even more than they have been already, and would be profoundly hostile and not helpful to sound EU development. Some noble Lords believe the opposite. The noble Lord, Lord Tomlinson, believes the opposite with great force and vigour. I always admire his energies, but I believe that his proposition that the Bill would somehow simultaneously weaken popular support for the European Union and respect for Parliament is 180 degrees wrong. The Bill points the way to much greater public confidence in Parliament and public commitment to the benefits of the European Union, and our role in it, in a completely changed world and international landscape. That is why I strongly urge noble Lords not to press their amendments, which do not add to the aims and goals of the Bill, or the aims and goals of a better and stronger European Union.