European Union Bill

My Lords, I view the Bill with an undisguised lack of enthusiasm. I fully understand the political imperatives that have led the coalition Government to putting forward legislation of this kind, but those political imperatives do not make the Bill either objectively necessary or desirable. I suggest that it is neither. I suggest that parts of it are unnecessary, other parts objectionable, and others ineffective. Above all, it is legislation that provides the illusion of certainty when in fact it is giving massive governmental discretion. There are three relevant commitments in the coalition agreement, which we have to take seriously. The first states: "““We will ensure that there is no further transfer of sovereignty or areas of power””—" from the UK to the EU— "““over the course of the next Parliament””." That commitment is easy to fulfil without any legislation. Moreover, if we think about the difficulties that existed not just in this country but all over Europe in getting the Lisbon treaty enacted, the fear that there is a realistic possibility of something like that happening again and further EU legislation being enacted that transfers powers is completely illusory. There is no appetite for further change in that direction in the overwhelming majority of EU countries. Even if there were an appetite for such further change, there is absolutely no need for the Government to agree to it. As has been pointed out several times in this debate, such changes would require unanimity. If the Government do not want it, they do not have to have it. No legislation is needed to fulfil that commitment. Legislation should not be introduced just to make people believe that the Government will actually do what they have very clearly said that they will do and have power to do. Moreover, the idea that the Bill would be truly constraining is illusory. It is extremely complex, but it still leaves a high degree of discretion for Ministers to decide whether a transfer of power or competence is involved. At paragraph 21 of the Explanatory Notes, provided very helpfully by the FCO, we are told: "““As the majority of treaties and Article 48(6) decisions will require the exercise of judgement as to whether a transfer of power or competence is involved, in those cases the Bill requires that a Minister must make a statement giving an opinion as to whether or not the Treaty or Article 48(6) decision meets the criteria for a referendum, and must give reasons. As with all Ministerial decisions, it would be possible for a member of the public to challenge the decisions of the Minister in such a statement””." So no certainty whatever is provided. It would seem, therefore, that nothing is gained by legislation when the Government could simply exercise their judgment in deciding whether a transfer of power is being proposed and not agree to it if they think that that is the case. The second commitment made in the coalition document states that, "““any proposed future treaty that transferred areas of power, or competences, would be subject to a referendum on that treaty—a ‘referendum lock’ … the use of any passerelle would require primary legislation””." That commitment cannot be described as unnecessary, in the sense of adding nothing new to our present arrangements; it adds a very substantial requirement, but I do not think that it is desirable. My main reason for saying that is that I am fundamentally opposed to referenda. They are inconsistent with representative parliamentary democracy. Every time one is proposed, we are told that it is quite exceptional and put forward only because of the fundamental importance of what is proposed and the need for the people to have the last word. So far from being exceptional, under the Bill we risk referenda proliferating and displacing the primacy of Parliament, which should be the real guardian not just of the popular will but of the rights and liberties of the individual citizen. The call for a referendum has become routine, and the more that referenda are agreed to, the harder they will be to resist. The Government clearly see that risk. In order to prevent unnecessary proliferation, elaborate provisions in Clause 5 enable the Minister to specify that proposed changes are not significant and therefore do not require a referendum. That sounds very sensible, but it means that once again the apparent certainty provided by a statutory enactment melts away in the face of the inevitable exercise of judgment as to what is and is not significant and what does and does not evoke a referendum. Why go through that charade of purported but not real legislative certainty when, in any given case, it is open to the Government of the day to call a referendum if they are genuinely nervous about the popular acceptability of what they are minded to agree with their EU partners? The provision in the Bill is, in my view, undesirable not only because of its illusory creation of certainty but, even more importantly, because its existence will actually weaken the hand of our Ministers when they negotiate in Brussels. They will have to look at any new proposal not just on the basis of whether it is in the national interest but also whether they dare to agree to it in case it triggers a referendum—without being sure whether it would or not. The third commitment in the coalition agreement states: "““We will examine the case for a United Kingdom Sovereignty Bill to make it clear that ultimate authority remains with Parliament””." The Government have clearly concluded that such a legislative enactment is required, and it now appears in the very curiously worded Clause 18, which we will no doubt want to consider carefully in due course. I find its inclusion puzzling to say the least. It has been clear since the European Communities Act was passed in 1972 that the supremacy of European law, in the area in which it operates, applies in this country only because Parliament has enacted that that should be the case. That is what the courts have said. Attempts have been made to argue to the contrary and to suggest that some new, higher, autonomous legal order has been created that has a life of its own, independent of its creation by UK statute. Those arguments have been knocked down comprehensively in our courts. The Bill is pointless. Either Parliament is sovereign, in which case it is unnecessary to say so, or it is not sovereign, in which case, as the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, cogently pointed out, nothing in the Bill can make it so. In these circumstances, it is difficult to see the benefit of restating the clear constitutional position. Paragraph 11 of the FCO's paper tells us very clearly that that is all that the provision is supposed to be doing. If it were done in a more felicitously phrased form than in Clause 18, it would at least be innocuous, but the fact that it could be innocuous is an inadequate reason for introducing legislation of this kind. I am afraid, therefore, that that leaves nothing in the Bill that I can truly commend to your Lordships.