European Union Bill

My Lords, I declare an interest, as I spent a good part of my career in the United Kingdom public service dealing with European affairs and some part of it as an official of the European Commission. This Bill is quite unlike the EU legislation with which we have been dealing over many years, principally that relating to the treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon. Under those treaties, we were undertaking commitments that involved the development of policies within the European Union. In this Bill, we are doing rather the reverse, because such commitments would in future be subject to a very strict condition—the so-called referendum lock—by which the agreement of the British public in a referendum would be required if the decisions transferred power or competence from the UK to the European Union. I shall deal, first, with the main features of the Bill and then say something about the context in which the Bill has been brought forward. The Bill, like almost all UK national legislation, is quite complicated and detailed. First, on the referendum lock, I suppose that it would have been possible to have a much shorter text, which simply stated that proposals within the EU that would transfer power or competence from the UK to the EU would require a national referendum for approval. However, the Bill does not do that. Instead, it lists the cases that could or would trigger a referendum if the Government wished to go ahead. Some of those, where a transfer of power or competence is proposed, are quite evident, notably any amendment of the Treaty on European Union or the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Secondly, there are those cases under the simplified revision procedure that would currently allow the European Council to decide unanimously in specific areas to switch from unanimity to qualified majority voting. That is covered by the referendum lock and clearly there is a case for that. I think that that will be examined in Committee, but it is an important part of the Bill. Finally, in Clause 6 there are other evidently important proposals, such as membership of the euro or the Schengen area. However, there are also some areas, such as in relation to the European public prosecutor’s office, that may need examination in Committee. The key element of the Bill is the referendum lock. It indicates more widely which potential actions would require an Act of Parliament as well as a referendum and those that might require parliamentary approval by resolution. For me, several points must be underlined in relation to the substance of the Bill. The first is all the possible transfers of power or competence to be covered by the referendum lock that are today subject to unanimity, which means that the UK Government can refuse them all without a referendum. That is very simple. It is only those cases where the UK would consider the proposed action so advantageous to the United Kingdom that it would not wish to use its veto that the referendum lock would come into play. That is an important point in understanding the substance of the Bill. Secondly, the exceptions to the referendum lock are very limited—notably, those cases where the Government conclude that the effect of a provision in relation to the UK is ““not significant””, as the noble Lord pointed out. That is in Clause 3(4). In all important matters, the lock is unbreakable. When I read this Bill for the first time, I thought that people would be dancing on Rannoch Moor, but I do not believe that that is the case—I got that wrong. I thought that it must be the case because the effect of the referendum lock is extremely strict. I have heard many comments from those who are opposed to our membership of the European Union that this is only a minor measure or a cosmetic measure or that something else is wrong with it. They are entitled to their view on membership—although they are wrong—but they are not entitled, in my view, to say that this is a minor measure. It is a watershed for our policy within the EU, because the consequence of the Bill is that normally, perhaps almost invariably, United Kingdom Governments would not agree to proposals covered by the referendum lock. That is why I have described this as the ““no referendum Bill””; the actions that might trigger a referendum would simply not be taken. The sole significant exception to the application of the referendum lock is accession treaties. Thus, in relation to the potential major accession of Turkey, there will almost certainly be a referendum in France, but this Bill does not trigger one here, although the Government could decide to have one on their own initiative. Thirdly, although it is clear why, in the light of press and public opinion, the referendum lock has been put forward, it is worth noting that this Bill involves an important constitutional change. It deprives Parliament of the decision in these cases and shifts it back to the people. If it were invoked, it would be a form of referendum government, not parliamentary government. In addition to the referendum lock, the Bill contains Clause 18, which is sometimes referred to as the parliamentary sovereignty clause and is perhaps more accurately described, as in the Bill, as the clause on the status of EU law. The Explanatory Notes correctly describe this clause—of course, it would now be in statute—as a restatement of the UK’s position over many years, which was most succinctly put by Lord Justice Denning, but was also well put by Lord Justice Laws, who has been quoted. Lord Justice Denning said: "““Community law is part of our law by our own statute””." That is the basic principle of it. Some people may think that that should not be in the Bill—many noble Lords may take that view—but in the current state of public opinion it is understandable why the Government have proposed it. That brings me finally to the context of the Bill, which I mentioned at the beginning of my speech. In this country, we have an amazing capacity to play down our achievements and to shoot ourselves in the foot. I am sorry that many of us have now tended to transfer that regrettable habit to our judgment of the European Union. We are bringing in a Bill that will affect our relationship substantially with the European Union. In reality, what does the European Union stand for? It exists to improve the quality and standard of life of its citizens, to which it has made a major contribution over its long existence and, as far as the UK is concerned, over a period of more than half a lifetime, during which we have benefited from and contributed to it. Its objectives, to which the Bill makes specific reference in Clause 4(1)(a), include the promotion of peace and well-being, the establishment of the single market, the principle of free movement of persons and the upholding and promoting of the values of the European Union in the wider world. Given the turmoil elsewhere in the world, the European Union has made a very good shot at attaining its objectives, as demonstrated by the very great attraction of the Union for its neighbours. I understand why the Bill is needed now, but we have to ensure that we can still play our role in the European Union. Contrary to the malaise that hangs over much public opinion here, I consider the European Union to have been a great liberalising force over many years. Memories are very short, but the introduction of the single market throughout this huge economic area involved, in one day, the abolition of millions—I repeat, millions—of forms and of oppressive customs controls. When I first lived in Belgium, there were 21 counters in the customs hall and an English cheese, which was sent to me as a present, took so long to get through customs that it was uneatable. Frontier controls have largely been eliminated. Remember those phrase books for English travellers abroad that had pages and pages about passing through customs. How antique they seem now. Of course we have regulations in the European Union, but the impact of many of them on the ordinary citizen is much exaggerated. However, we have a mountain of UK national—not EU—secondary legislation. In a recent period in this House, we had 2,364 national statutory instruments, of which 94—about 4 per cent—directly implemented EU law. Whatever people may say, the UK maintains national control of all the most important aspects of public life that concern citizens: public finances, taxation, education, transport and the environment, to quote but a few. This Bill is important in maintaining that position unless the British public decide otherwise, but it needs fairly thorough examination in Committee.