Budget Responsibility and National Audit Bill [HL]

My Lords, perhaps I may just get my head round the formal non-moving of an amendment that has not been put down. I shall try to give the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, the reassurance that he seeks in this area. The Government support the spirit of the amendment. Transparency and parliamentary scrutiny of the OBR’s budget are absolutely central to safeguarding its independence. I do not think that there is any difference between us on that point. The next issue is getting a proportional arrangement which achieves the objective. The effect of the proposed amendment has already been achieved. In line with the Treasury Select Committee's recommendation, the annual budget of the OBR will be identified separately in the Treasury's estimate and it will be available for the Treasury Committee to scrutinise in another place. Nevertheless, we have gone further than the Treasury Committee asked for in order to enhance the transparency of the OBR’s budget and critically to protect it from any suggestion of politically motivated cuts. Again, in line with the Treasury Select Committee’s recommendation, the OBR will also be able to submit to the Treasury Select Committee an additional estimates memorandum alongside that of the Treasury in which it can explain for itself the reasons for changes in the available budget for the year ahead. I think that will go beyond what is proposed, in effect, in this amendment because the OBR will be free to explain in full what any changes in the budget mean. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Burns, that if we need to be concerned about anything here it is the multi-year aspects of it, which the proposed amendment does not address. The OBR has already been provided with an agreed and publicly documented multi-year budget, so that an annual budget exercise cannot be used to exert hidden pressure on the OBR. This specific element has been welcomed by the IMF. I will divert for a moment to address one or two of the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, on some of the international experience in this area. While I am sure that the Toronto Globe and Mail is a fine source of reporting, I think it is relevant to remember that the Canadian parliamentary budget officer is really not in any comparable position to the OBR. Its budget is not separately identified anywhere within the estimates of expenditure presented to the Canadian Parliament. It is a very different office from the one we are looking at. The parliamentary budget officer in Canada was not given an agreed and published multi-year budget. I think we are in very different territory from Canada. Hungary was mentioned. It is interesting to note that Hungary’s fiscal council chairman pointed out—I do not know whether this is correct—in the context of saying it was very, very rare to introduce substantial changes or abolish fiscal councils that the only example he could point to was Venezuela under Hugo Chavez abolishing its fiscal council. So there are one or two examples but they are not comparable examples. It is precisely to guard against any suggestion of such interference that we have put in place the measures that we have. In trying to give the noble Lord the reassurance he seeks, we have discussed already the responsibility of the OBR’s non-executives. Critical to that is their duty to report on anything that appears to them to constrain the OBR’s discretion. Of course, that would include any attempt to control the OBR through manipulating its budget. To quote the chair of the Treasury Select Committee: "““It is vital that the OBR has the resources it needs. The Committee will monitor this carefully: the terms of reference suggest that the Treasury accepts the importance of transparency and separate disclosure, and we will have the information we need””—" we, the Treasury Select Committee— "““to do our work””." The package of measures we propose for the OBR in the Bill follows the recommendations of the Select Committee and in the judgment of the Treasury fully reflects that intention. The chair of the OBR has already made clear that he has adequate resources and that he will promptly raise any issues on funding with the Select Committee—a very public forum in which to raise any concerns. Finally, I will quote Robert Chote at his pre-appointment hearing in front of the Select Committee. He said: "““If you accede to my appointment and I find myself being squeezed in that way, this committee will be hearing about it very promptly. That’s how we make that public and ensure that those sorts of pressures do not go unremarked””." I suggest that there are a considerable number of safeguards in place. Indeed, we go further than the noble Lord’s proposed amendment because we believe that it is the multi-year dimension that is as important as, if not more important than, the single year dimension to which his amendment refers. In view of the reassurance that I have been able to give him, in particular pointing to the role that we have just now confirmed for the non-executives, I hope that he will withdraw the amendment.