European Union Bill

I am grateful to all right hon. and hon. Members who have taken part in today's debate: my hon. Friends the Members for Bury North (Mr Nuttall), for Hertsmere (Mr Clappison), for Daventry (Chris Heaton-Harris), for Harwich and North Essex (Mr Jenkin), for Aldridge-Brownhills (Mr Shepherd) and for Dover (Charlie Elphicke); my right hon. Friend the Member for Wokingham (Mr Redwood) and my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud (Neil Carmichael); and equally the hon. Members for Luton North (Kelvin Hopkins), for Caerphilly (Mr David), for North Durham (Mr Jones), for Dunfermline and West Fife (Thomas Docherty), and for Linlithgow and East Falkirk (Michael Connarty). The debate has moved between passion and intense thoughtfulness, and both those qualities were demonstrated in the opening speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash). Although he and I have our differences this evening, I want to place on the record my respect not just for the contribution that he has made to tonight's debate but for the commitment that he has shown in his chairmanship of the European Scrutiny Committee. He is a gentleman with whom I may disagree from time to time, but I happily salute him as a patriot and a champion of the rights and privileges of the British Parliament. We differ over which form of words and which draft of amendment will best accomplish the objectives that we seek. As today's debate covers both the question of approving clause 18 and the amendments and new clauses that have been tabled, I want to structure my comments first by making clear the Government's purpose in introducing the clause and then going on to address the individual amendments and new clauses. Clause 18 addresses the concern that the principle of parliamentary sovereignty, as it relates to European Union law, might in future be eroded by decisions of the United Kingdom's domestic courts. It would provide authority that could be relied on to counter arguments that European law could become an integral and autonomous part of the UK's legal system independent of statute. It responds to concerns that the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty as it relates to EU law may not be unassailably absolute, and may be qualified. The concern is that the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty is part of common law—a point illustrated by the report by the European Scrutiny Committee and the evidence it took, and clearly a matter that is subject to intense academic debate and contention. The risk is that British courts might, in future, be attracted to the argument that European law no longer takes effect in this country by virtue of an Act of Parliament but has become entrenched in our legal system, enjoying an autonomous status—in the jargon, it has become a basic ““grundnorm”” underlying the UK legal system, to be applied by our courts and against which ultimately UK legislation falls to be measured. There are three main sources for that concern. The first stems, yes, from the arguments run by the counsel for the prosecution in the so-called ““metric martyrs”” case of Thoburn v. Sunderland City Council. It is worth saying a little about that case because the issues raised were of great significance. The prosecution argued that the European treaties' effect in domestic law did not depend—merely, at least—on the terms of their incorporation by the European Communities Act 1972 but, to a decisive extent, on the principles of European law itself. The argument was that European law had been entrenched rather than merely incorporated, by virtue not of any principle of domestic constitutional law but of principles of Community law already established in cases such as Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen and Costa v. Enel, to which hon. Members have referred in this debate. If that argument had prevailed and if it were to prevail in the future, we would need to think about what the practical effect might be. For example, let me take the prohibition on discrimination on grounds of nationality set out in article 18 of the treaty on the functioning of the European Union. Our courts have recognised that the provision has direct effect in the United Kingdom. Under the prosecution's principle in the ““metric martyrs”” case, the courts would interpret that prohibition and seek to enforce it as part of UK law, even if Parliament were to remove the statutory mechanism by which it had been given effect in the UK, by either repealing or amending the European Communities Act 1972. But if we pass clause 18 and enshrine in statute the principle that the authority of European law derives solely from Acts of Parliament, then the courts could not do that because article 18 could have direct effect in the UK only because Parliament had provided a statutory mechanism to allow that. If that statutory mechanism were to be repealed without replacement, there would be no basis on which it could be given direct effect in this country. Although those arguments were rejected by Lord Justice Laws, they could well be made again in future cases.