European Union Bill

I totally endorse that comment by my hon. Friend. There might even be in this coalition, for reasons of political convenience, a will in the wrong direction. It is certainly not what the British people want or what we stood for in our election manifesto. Provided that the UK courts recognise the sovereignty of Parliament, any legal dispute or clash between the British legal system, under the sovereignty of Parliament, and the European Community legal system, would be resolved by political negotiation. However, that is only the case so long as the UK courts recognise the sovereignty of Parliament and our right to suspend selectively legal instruments. That is a very important negotiation lever. But will that lever be available to Ministers in the future? Will that option be available to Parliament and future Governments? That is where the challenge lies. This is the crux of why we need a true sovereignty clause. Let me revert once again to the much-quoted Professor Adam Tomkins. The hon. Member for Caerphilly said that he could not see any threat from the European Union to the sovereignty of Parliament. Professor Tomkins accepts in principle that we can legislate unilaterally to suspend Community instruments, when he says:"““If an Act were to be passed in terms such as these the courts could not refuse to apply it without asserting a power which our constitution has not hitherto accorded to them and to which no English court has yet laid claim. Should the issue arise, however, the response of the British courts cannot be predicted with certainty.””" That is where the threat from European law arises: ““cannot be predicted with certainty””. Professor Tomkins goes on to talk about what would happen"““if the United Kingdom refused to pay…a penalty””" for a breach of European Community law,"““insisting on its national sovereignty””." Incidentally, that is something that has been recommended to try to sort out the budget by no less than Lord Heseltine, so he should want Parliament to be able to assert its sovereignty. However, I do not know whether he understood the consequences of what he said, because there is no legal way for the Government to withhold payments to the European Union unless we suspend the legal instrument under which we have to make such payments. As was quoted earlier, Professor Tomkins also said:"““European Union law is far from being the only contemporary challenge to the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty.””" By that he means that European Union law is indeed a challenge to parliamentary sovereignty, so I do not quite understand what the hon. Member for Caerphilly meant when he said what he said. Professor Tomkins went on—I am selectively quoting, but these are the relevant parts—to say that"““certainly nothing in clause 18…which addresses the problem of the further development of EU law at the hands of the European Courts””," addresses the further development of ECJ jurisprudence. He continued:"““Let us not forget that many of the doctrines of EU law that have posed the greatest challenge for parliamentary sovereignty find their origin not in the articles of the Treaties, nor even in European legislation, but in the case law of the ECJ.””" That takes us back to the Van Gend en Loos and Costa cases. When we reach a point at which the ECJ makes a judgment that is contrary to our national interest, should our Parliament not be able to say, without fear from our own courts, ““I'm sorry, up with this we will not put””? That is the position that we need to be in. Professor Tomkins says:"““Neither clause 18 nor any other provision in the Bill safeguards the United Kingdom from the further development of EU law by the ECJ.””"