European Union Bill

With the greatest respect, we have already had one intervention from the right hon. Gentleman. Perhaps he would be kind enough to wait. It would be ironic to say the least if the slogan ““Working together in the national interest””, which we saw at our party conference, were to become ““Working together against the national interest””. I do not believe that any Member of Parliament or any Minister would agree that the coalition—a ““temporary alliance””, according to the ““Oxford English Dictionary””—should be employed in any way to pass legislation that would undermine parliamentary sovereignty. Incidentally, I am somewhat appalled at the lack of coverage not of this debate but of the European Scrutiny Committee report when it came out, given the fundamental nature of the issues at stake, and the quality of analysis not only in the report itself but in the evidence given to us by probably the most distinguished constitutional experts in the land. I will turn first to the constitutional and legal issues that clause 18 raises and which were carefully considered for several weeks by the European Scrutiny Committee, which received evidence on a completely even-handed basis, which, because of the fundamental importance of the issues to our constitution and our democracy, was well worth doing. In the course of the proceedings it became clear that many of the constitutional experts concerned felt that, at the very least, clause 18 was completely unnecessary. The most compelling evidence—the evidence that we received from Professors Tomkins and Goldsworthy, along with a number of others—was that clause 18 was hazardous and dangerous, particularly in the light of the Government's assertions. The issue of parliamentary sovereignty has been a matter of fundamental concern, importance and action since the 17th century. However, parliamentary sovereignty acquired a special and fundamental significance with the extension of the franchise in the mid-19th century, from the Reform Act of 1867 onwards—for example, through the Reform Acts of 1885 and 1884—and is undoubtedly the democratic basis of the United Kingdom constitution. However, irrespective of its now democratic basis, parliamentary sovereignty has become increasingly questioned recently—and only very recently—by reason of judicial assertions. Although on the tin, as well as in many repeated statements, we were told—I refer now to my hon. Friends on the Conservative Benches—that we would be getting a sovereignty clause or even a sovereignty Bill, clause 18 is emphatically not a sovereignty clause. For reasons that I will explain, the clause will actually undermine parliamentary sovereignty by encouraging judicial supremacy. The explanatory notes put forward the dangerous notion that parliamentary sovereignty is a ““common law principle””, and therefore subject to judicial authority. However, even if the explanatory notes were disavowed on this matter, the problem of judicial assertions relating to parliamentary sovereignty would not disappear.