Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc. Bill [Lords]

I did not know that we were going to proceed at such a quick pace this evening, although perhaps it is not as quick as you, Mr Deputy Speaker, and other colleagues might have hoped. I hope that we will not detain the House too much longer on the matters before us. I will deal with amendments 6 to 10 first, before returning to amendment 1. As the right hon. Member for Delyn (Mr Hanson) pointed out, amendment 1 relates to a topic that gave rise to one of the longer debates in Committee. The amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert) relate to the appointment of the independent reviewer and the terms by which he will report. My hon. Friend and other hon. Members will be aware that such amendments were debated at length during the Bill's passage in the other place and in Committee. As I said in Committee, the proposals are based on the provisions of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 that relate to the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation. That provides an effective and suitable model for the statutory independent asset-freezing reviewer. Amendment 6 would require the independent reviewer to be approved by Parliament. I believe that the intention is to ensure that the reviewer is suitably independent of Government. I hope that I can reassure my hon. Friend that the Government are fully committed to the independence of the reviewer. Independent oversight is an essential element of the safeguards that the coalition Government have introduced into the Bill, and it will be the principal objective of any appointment. I will touch on the recruitment process later. We do not believe that it is necessary for Parliament to approve the independent reviewer. That would be a significant departure from standard practice. The appointment of the reviewer by Government reflects the long-standing principle of ministerial responsibility. It is Ministers who are accountable to Parliament and to the public for the people whom they appoint. Parliament will, of course, be able to scrutinise the work of the reviewer and to hold him or her to account through existing mechanisms—for example, through Select Committee scrutiny. My hon. Friend proposed the compromise of a requirement that an appropriate Select Committee approve the appointment of the reviewer. The Minister for the Cabinet Office and Paymaster General is due to meet the Liaison Committee shortly to discuss the pre-appointment hearing process. A decision to add new appointments to the list of posts subject to pre-appointment scrutiny may be announced as a result of that meeting. Amendments 7, 8 and 9 would replace the independent reviewer's obligation to report to the Treasury and the Treasury's obligation to lay that report before Parliament with an obligation for the reviewer to report directly to Parliament. To draw a comparison, all the annual reports and ad hoc reports produced by Lord Carlile, the current independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, have been provided in the first instance to the Home Office to check that they do not inadvertently contain any classified material that cannot be published. Hon. Members will recognise that asset freezing deals with sensitive and classified information. That is why the Government believe that a similar approach is appropriate. The independent reviewer will have access to all relevant papers and evidence, including highly classified intelligence reports and, on occasion, material that is being considered as part of a separate criminal prosecution. It is important to ensure that published reports do not include classified or sub judice material, and Parliament could not undertake such a check. I reassure my hon. Friend that the Government will not seek to influence the outcome of any report. The reports will be provided to Parliament as quickly as possible after they have been delivered, and they will be available to the public. Amendment 10 suggests that the appointment of the independent reviewer should be for five years, and that it should not be renewable. We do not believe it necessary or desirable to have a statutory limit on the length of time that a reviewer should remain in post. There might be valid reasons why someone wishes to step down at an earlier stage, but there might also be valid reasons why they wish to occupy the position for a longer period. They will build up significant experience and significant knowledge of how legislation works, and that will be invaluable. It is important to take the opportunity to learn from the experience of the current reviewer and see how he feels the system should work. In the debate in the other place, Lord Carlile said about appointment procedures:"““As to the way in which the independent reviewer is appointed, I do not have any very strong views. Appointment by a Minister does not make the reviewer any less independent. Many public appointments have sprung surprises on government; for example, chief inspectors of prisons. Independence is in the way the person concerned operates.””—[Official Report, House of Lords, 25 October 2010; Vol. 721, c. 1085.]" I notice that the right hon. Member for Delyn raises his eyebrows at the reference to the chief inspector of prisons—he clearly knows from his own experience how independent such people can be once they are appointed. On the question of whether submitting reports to the Government, rather than directly to Parliament, would run the risk of reports being altered in any way, Lord Carlile said:"““I cannot imagine any circumstances in which any honourable person appointed to this role would be prepared to change their report at the behest of a Minister or civil servant for political reasons. It has never happened. It did not happen with any of the reviewers before I was appointed, it has not happened during my period of tenure, and I do not think it will happen with any successor I can foresee under the present or changed arrangements.””—[Official Report, House of Lords, 25 October 2010; Vol. 721, c. 1086.]" That reinforces the right hon. Gentleman's experiences. It is essential that the independent review of the asset-freezing regime is robust, impartial and transparent, and we are satisfied that the provisions in the Bill regarding the appointment and operation of the reviewer are appropriate to achieve that. I therefore hope that my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge will not press his amendments. Amendment 1, tabled by the right hon. Member for Delyn, would, as he said, ensure that whoever fulfilled the role of Home Office independent reviewer of terrorist legislation would also fulfil the role of independent reviewer of asset freezing. I shall provide the House with an update on the Treasury's position on the appointment of an independent reviewer, but first I wish to set out why we do not support the amendment. The Government do not accept that the independent reviewer for asset freezing must always be the same person as the Home Office counter-terrorism reviewer. Requiring them to be the same person would unnecessarily reduce flexibility, and could therefore constrain the Government's ability to appoint the best person to the post. There might be good reasons why, in a particular case, both roles could not be held by the same person. For example, the best qualified person for the job might simply not have the time to carry out both roles to the level required. We have to remember that both roles are demanding and important. Counter-terrorism legislation is an expansive and complex area, and the issues raised concerning the balance between protecting security and protecting civil liberties are of fundamental importance. Moreover, individuals may well wish to combine their work as independent reviewers with other ongoing professional commitments. That is entirely reasonable, as long as it does not give rise to conflicts of interest. In the light of that, it would be wrong to say that we must only ever appoint somebody who can perform both roles. We need to retain flexibility and always look for the most suitable person to do the job. We recognise, however, that there are good arguments for combining the two roles where it is possible and desirable to do so. That might produce greater consistency and coherence and better value for money, as the right hon. Member for Delyn said in Committee. As I have said, however, we need to consider the matter on a case-by-case basis and not just assume that combining the two roles is the only approach that can work. I now turn to the current situation. Myofficials have been in close contact with Home Office and Cabinet Office officials to explore the matter further. There has also been an initial discussion with the incoming counter-terrorism reviewer, David Anderson, to explore whether he would be willing to be considered for the asset freezing reviewer post. Mr Anderson has indicated that he would be willing to take up the post were it to be offered to him, and that neither he nor the Treasury is aware of any impediment to his taking on the role were it to be offered. At this stage, the Treasury has not made an offer of appointment to the role, and in our view it would be premature to do so. After all, the Bill is not yet law and the post does not yet exist. However, I reassure the House that the Treasury is considering all the relevant issues, including value for money and the interconnection of the two roles. The process of appointing a reviewer is on track, and the appointment will be made in plenty of time for the reviewer to prepare their first report, which is due nine months after the Bill comes into force. I hope that that update will reassure Members of the progress that the Treasury is making in filling the post, and of its recognition of the points made today about costs and the interconnection of the two roles. On that basis, I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will be willing to withdraw his amendment.