Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism

My hon. Friend makes a very good case, and he knows Northern Ireland terrorism better than most people in this House. He also knows that internment was one of the best recruiting sergeants for the Provisional IRA and others in that period. So yes, he is right. The second hard fact I want to draw on relates to the reasons given to me for 42 and 90 days by John Reid, the predecessor as Home Secretary of both my right hon. Friend the current Secretary of State and my friend the shadow Secretary of State. When John Reid briefed me, as shadow Home Secretary, on his Government's proposals for those periods of detention, the most telling argument he had—to be fair, it was telling—was the prospect of the British agencies being overwhelmed by multiple prospective attacks at the same time. The circumstances he listed were as follows: multiple plots against multiple targets at multiple locations, with not all the information involved being in our control—perhaps some of it was coming from foreign intelligence agencies such as the Pakistani service—and with the plot already starting to be carried out, so that it was necessary to move quickly. That was the case the then Home Secretary made, and within a month or so of his briefing me on it we almost had a rehearsal in Operation Overt, the Heathrow plot, to which the shadow Home Secretary referred. It was thought at the time that 10 aircraft had been targeted, although it now turns out that the true number was seven, as well as multiple locations—there were many suspects at the beginning in at least three different locations. There were also concerns about gaining access to some of the houses and other places where evidence was thought to be located, and foreign evidence was involved, too. It was a facsimile of the case John Reid had described.