Export Control (Iran) (Amendment) Order 2010

My Lords, it is appropriate that this debate, which I hope will be very short, should come straight after the important resolutions that have just been moved by the Leader of the House—which may or may not be considered tough enough and radical enough—that govern European Union scrutiny reserve and opt-in procedures, since the matter that I am raising touches on the distribution of powers between this House and the EU institutions, although in a way that is rather different from the way in which they are usually handled and described through the scrutiny procedures. This Export Control (Iran) (Amendment) Order has a clear-enough purpose. It is to extend the list of goods and technology that it is an offence to supply, sell or transfer to Iran. I make it crystal clear that we entirely agree with the policy. Any pressures that can help to curb the destructive ambitions of a repulsive regime are welcome, particularly if that regime is now moving in an unapproved way towards weaponising its nuclear power and threatening to destroy neighbouring countries. This is not the place to go into wider issues about making strengthened sanctions work, which are currently being discussed in a number of forums, or to discuss the prospects of getting Chinese and Russian co-operation, without which no sanctions will be fully effective. That is a much wider issue. Why then are we concerned about this amended order? Although it is a small item, it stands at the crossroads of much larger ones. In this case, I have the excellent report by the Merits of Statutory Instruments Committee to thank for identifying the issue and urging that we give it further examination. The outcome of the order is to give the European Union Commission new powers, although admittedly very modest ones, over our national policy, in this case, in the highly sensitive area of shaping and determining our foreign policy. The Merits Committee stated: ""The Commission will now be able to amend these Annexes without reference to the Council, on the basis of information supplied to them by EU Member States, and not just on the basis of determinations made by either the UN Security Council or the UN Sanctions Committee as was the case under the previous Regulation. The Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) have said that they do not think this amendment causes problems in practice and have explained that the nature of an amendment to an Annex would determine whether they would lay a new SI or not. As the Annexes will be directly applicable to the UK, the House may therefore wish to satisfy itself that there are sufficient safeguards in place around this extended"—" I emphasise the word "extended"— ""power of the Commission"." It is that satisfaction that I now seek in the interests of your Lordships' House and of serving our proper duty to be vigilant in protecting this Parliament’s powers and safeguarding any further transfer of powers that may be taking place. As I say in my regret Motion, I find it a little difficult to understand how this type of regulation and the power shift implicit in it can take place without the Government at least explaining to Parliament how it would be implemented in practice and how our sovereignty will be affected. When the Minister replies, I would like him to explain that to noble Lords and also why the Government consider that the European Union Commission is the appropriate institution for taking this power and exercising this aspect of UK policy most effectively. It is obvious that the overall application of sanctions pressures by the European Union should be in the hands of the institutions, but the power to shape our own foreign policy considerations should surely rest with us. Handing yet more powers—I have to say that—to the European Union institutions needs deep consideration. Some may think it is a marvellous idea; some may think it has gone too far. It needs deep thought and, frankly, I do not believe that this order has had very much of that either. I am concerned about the lack of time that has been spent on scrutinising the implications of this order—although the Merits Committee have done an excellent job—and I am concerned about the precedent it sets for the future. If we are an effective legislature, we should not let something like this simply pass without very careful examination and comment. I beg to move.