Al-Qaida and Taliban (Asset-Freezing) Regulations 2010

My Lords, I hope that the envelope I have just been passed is not relevant to the debate. I thank the Minister for his explanation of the regulations and of their relationship—or non-relationship—to parallel legislation. The context in which we are debating the draft regulations includes the report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which calls for a review of all anti-terrorism legislation. When I made a note yesterday of the few things that I wanted to say on these draft regulations, the first thing that I wrote down was "piecemeal". It would be more than helpful—in fact, it would be proper and appropriate—for us to look at anti-terrorism legislation across the board, rather than to apply what the noble Baroness called a sticking plaster. Dealing with this bit by bit is not satisfactory. When the bits include a statutory instrument that we cannot amend, it is even less satisfactory. Another part of the context is the amount that is currently frozen. When we debated the emergency legislation last month, the Minister gave us a figure of about £150,000. He gave more figures today, but I did not catch whether that amount covered both regimes or whether it was a similar amount for this regime. Previously, we debated the fact that however small the amount—£150,000 is not much—one can create a lot of havoc with very few resources. I will not make too much of that. I still find it difficult that we are not taking the 2001 Act as a starting point, extending it to cover the UK and so on. In particular, creating offences by secondary legislation makes me very uncomfortable, whatever the 1972 Act said. I agree with the noble Baroness that, if we cannot use existing legislation, we should look at the proposed permanent legislation for both regimes. When we debated the emergency legislation, we heard explanations of why the 2001 Act would not work. But this says to me that the Government should get the primary legislation up to scratch, so that we have something that is complete, scrutinisable—if that is a word—and amendable. I thank the Minister for taking on board the point that I made yesterday about consultation on the proposed new permanent legislation. The issue occurred to me only just before going into the Chamber, and I hoped that it would not put me on the right wing of the argument if I appeared to suggest that there should be more confidentiality than was proposed. I did not mean that, but I am beginning to get a greater feel for the complexity of some of these matters than I had when I took on the home affairs brief only three months ago. We appreciate and share the objective of restricting funds that might go to terrorist causes, or might have terrorist applications, provided that it is properly done. We will not oppose the regulations. We are where we are, and some of the issues highlighted in the cases that ended up in the Supreme Court, particularly human rights issues, remain. At the time of the emergency legislation on 5 February, a Written Statement was made about licensing and the factors that the Government would take into account. I found that Statement very reassuring because of concerns about descriptions of the draconian effects of the orders—the word "draconian" was used by the Supreme Court. I am unclear whether that approach applies to those who will be affected by this order. It would be helpful to have on the record the fact that that approach is formally a matter for this order as well as for the legislation that we debated and passed last month. Paragraph 9 in the order, to which I would have tabled a probing amendment had I been able to do so, deals with the offences of "a body corporate etc". I am interested in the "etc". Individuals may commit an offence where their own body corporate is guilty of an offence; that is where the offence is committed with the consent or the connivance of an individual or is attributable to any neglect. The term "neglect" seems to me to be very wide and certainly wider than "consent" and "connivance" and is something that is more likely to happen than recklessness—it is further along the spectrum. I have a degree of concern about that. One can be neglectful without intending to be and without intending the effect. The Minister may say that, if there is a trial, that will be taken into account when sentencing. Can the Minister say anything about that provision? I would also have tabled amendments rather similar to those moved by my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford on the length of time, the number of repeat directions, the need for findings of fact, and appeal and judicial oversight. The Minister has referred to some of those and I note what he said about the UN proceedings and an ombudsman. That is helpful. Although the subject matter is immensely important, we on these Benches are uncomfortable about approaching the matters this way, although clearly, at this stage in the parliamentary cycle, that is what we will have to do.