Extradition Act 2003 (Amendment to Designations) Order 2010

I thank both noble Baronesses for their contributions. As ever, the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Jones, was forensic in her questions. Answering them is always at least uncomfortable for a Minister. I will start with what is almost a disclaimer: if I do not do justice to the questions, I will certainly look at Hansard and ensure that I send fuller replies to both noble Baronesses. The first question was about whether the delay has had any impact. There have been no extradition requests from Libya nor any in the other direction, so, whatever the unfortunate nature of the delay, it has not on this occasion caused major problems. Both noble Baronesses were rightly concerned about safeguards and evidence, and about what is meant by prima facie evidence and what the requirement is. Prior to issuing a warrant for arrest, a district judge would have to consider if there was evidence providing reasonable grounds. Libya has not been designated as a country that need only provide information, as opposed to evidence. During the extradition hearing, Libya would have to establish a prima facie case and could not be relieved of the burden of establishing such a case. Therefore, there could be no question of inconsistency between the treaty and the Extradition Act. Both noble Baronesses were rightly concerned about the human rights record in Libya and how we will build in safeguards to protect both our own citizens and others from misuse of the treaty. We see human rights as extremely important. The judge in question must consider several facts. The first is identity. Extradition will be barred if the judge is not satisfied that the person before him is the person being sought. It will be barred if dual criminality is not established. The evidence must pass the test of reasonable suspicion. Extradition will be barred if the request is made for improper reasons—that is, if the judge decides that the request has been made to persecute or punish a person, or that the person will face prejudice at his or her trial on the grounds of race, religion, nationality, gender, sexual orientation or political opinion. I understand the concern about mission creep. It is something that we must be constantly on guard against, because it applies in so many areas of international corporation, and in international treaties. The treaty does allow extradition offences that are not described in exactly the same way; the noble Baroness was correct in making that statement. It has long been clear that, in extradition cases, the key consideration is whether the conduct underpinning the extradition request constitutes a crime in the state receiving the request. If the question were whether the conduct was criminalised in exactly the same way in both countries, this would prevent extradition solely because of differences between countries in the drafting of laws, which is common. It is important to be clear that this is not an extension of the principle that has covered extradition for many years, namely that of dual criminality. Nothing in the treaty changes that. The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, raised a number of questions. The easiest one to deal with is whether the treaty subsumes previous international obligations. The answer is that it provides for the first time a comprehensive framework for extradition between the two countries. Prior to the conclusion of this, as has been rightly stated, extradition relations were piecemeal under international multilateral agreements and discrete areas of criminality. The multilateral agreement will continue to apply between the countries but, in view of the more comprehensive agreement which now exists, and even though the previous agreements still exist, we expect any extradition requests to be made under this agreement, rather than under the international obligations entered into by both countries. Another key question was: who has to supply evidence when there is a request for the extradition of someone from the United Kingdom? Within the framework of the new Libyan extradition treaty, and under the Extradition Act 2003, it is for the requesting state—in this case, Libya—to establish the evidential case justifying extradition. It would be for the Libyans to convince a UK court that there was evidence against the person in question that established, as I said previously, a prima facie case of guilt of the relevant offence. It would be for the authorities in Libya to assemble the evidence, which would then be presented and judged in a British court. The other question that has been raised is the broader issue of human rights. The noble Baroness read extracts from Amnesty International reports which deal with issues as broad as freedom of association, which are constrained in a whole series of countries, not least Libya. She asked what we are doing. Such rights are a broader issue. We are strong supporters of the European Union’s attempts to negotiate a framework agreement with Libya that will provide a platform for dialogue on co-operation in the wide area of human rights and fundamental freedoms. What have we done to assist the Libyan authorities in any way? Since 2004 the Foreign and Commonwealth Office has funded a large prison project, which is being implemented by the International Centre for Prison Studies in King’s College. Clearly, there are advantages to the United Kingdom in assisting Libya. Although there are rightly still criticisms of the Libyan record on human rights, it is a fact that it has improved. The Libyan media is not as free as we would wish, and domestic political opposition is clearly not as free and open as it should be. However, those issues can be better addressed in an ongoing, collaborative new relationship with that country. In that sense, the more we can build in treaties, milestones and even cornerstones, the easier it will be to build normal relationships—not only as we understand them in this country but as they are understood, and will be understood in the future, in many parts of the world where, at the moment, perhaps they are not. To the extent that I have failed to answer the questions, I shall certainly look at Hansard and give both noble Baronesses a detailed reply. I commend the order to the Committee.