Pharmacy Order 2010

My Lords, I am perfectly prepared to accept, as the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, has said, that there may well be circumstances where it is proper for an inspector appointed under this order to gain entry to and inspect premises, but the central question to the Motion is whether the power should be exercised without the consent of the occupier—the registered pharmacist, let us say—and without the benefit of a court order. I support the noble and learned Lord, Lord Scott, because he is absolutely right to base his case on the fact that entry without consent and without the benefit of a court order is contrary to principle. I should like the Minister to tell us whether the Government accept that it is contrary to principle. There are many circumstances in which it is legitimate to go against a principle, but they depend essentially on exceptional circumstances of which probably the most important is necessity, as the noble and learned Lord said. So what necessity is perceived by the Government in drawing this power as widely as it is drawn? I suggest that this is a glaring departure from principle and one that is not justified by any perceived necessity. Why is it glaring? It is glaring because the council can make any order that it likes, consistent with the powers which the statute gives it. Article 9 states: ""The Council must make provision in rules relating to … the circumstances in which inspectors may conduct special inspections of, and other visits to, registered pharmacies"." If one looks a little further, one can see that, within its overall purposes, the council has carte blanche to make any rule it likes. Once it has done so, all the panoply of powers which this order confers on inspectors becomes available. So it is a glaringly wide departure from principle and one for which it is very difficult to see any justification when one approaches it, as I do, without knowledge of the Government’s case. So I hope the Minister will say, first, whether the Government accept that it is contrary to principle to have a power of entry without consent and without a court order, bearing in mind that the court order provisions here are permissive and not obligatory, and secondly, whether she perceives any necessity for a breach of that principle.