Constitutional Reform and Governance Bill

In practice, special advisers cannot do that; I am certainly ready to consider amendments to that effect. May I also just say—I have often reflected on this—that I was an adviser for three and a half years and I have appointed advisers for the past 12 and a half years, and in neither role would I have thought it remotely appropriate for a special adviser to have given instructions to a civil servant, but there are some exceptions, which need to be borne in mind? When he came into office, the Prime Minister decided to repeal the Order in Council, introduced in 1997, that allowed for Jonathan Powell and Alastair Campbell to be able to give such instructions. I think that the Prime Minister was right to repeal that, given the concern, but I do not necessarily think this is something that ought to be enshrined in statute; it may be better if it were in the code, because I do not remotely regard it as a hanging offence for a future Prime Minister to decide, for example, that the head of his office should combine both roles. That is a different role from that of any other special adviser, but we can discuss that when we consider the details of the Bill. The Bill also enshrines the principle of appointment to the civil service on merit, and the principle of fair and open competition. On the issue of treaties, every year, the UK becomes party to many treaties that result in binding obligations under international law. Treaties that come into force after the Government have expressed their consent to be bound through a formal act such as ratification are subject to the so-called "Ponsonby rule". It was named after Arthur Ponsonby, who was a member of the first Labour Cabinet, which sat for nine months in 1924. The rule requires the treaty to be published and laid before both Houses for a minimum of 21 sitting days prior to ratification, in order to give Parliament an opportunity to scrutinise it. Although the Ponsonby rule is well established—it was quickly abandoned by the Conservative Administration who won the election in 1924, but it has been followed post-war—it is based on constitutional convention, rather than law, and Parliament has no ability formally to veto a ratification; it has been a Crown matter. As Foreign Secretary, I felt that that was simply wrong. One of the key roles of a Parliament is to decide whether or not to ratify international instruments; the power should be one for Parliament and, in particular, for this place; it should not be a power for the Crown. I am delighted, as Justice Secretary, to put that right. Part 2 of the Bill places the Ponsonby rule in statute and, for the first time, gives legal force to a negative vote in the Commons on the ratification of international treaties. Where Parliament requires more time for scrutiny, the Bill enables a Minister to extend the 21-day period in respect of a treaty. Consistent with the Ponsonby rule, provision is made for flexibility in exceptional circumstances, and there are exceptions for specific categories of treaty that are already subject to other scrutiny arrangements. I am sorry not to see the hon. Member for Stone (Mr. Cash) in his place, because I was fully expecting him to rise to the bait in this Bill and say what an outrage it was that European Union treaties were not mentioned in it. For those who wish to take his place and foam at the mouth at the very idea of the European Union, I must say that EU treaties are mentioned. Colleagues will see that clause 24(1) states that this set of arrangements does not cover treaties that amend founding treaties of the European Union. That is because there is already more extensive provision requiring those to be ratified by this House and by the other place. The third part of the Bill deals with the House of Lords. The House of Lords Act 1999 was an historic and long overdue reform that removed the majority of hereditary peers. Part 3 of the Bill contains a package of measures to continue along that path towards a more legitimised second Chamber. Colleagues will recall that when that legislation was going through the other place it ran into a roadblock set up by a Cecil, Viscount Cranborne. That family have five centuries, at least, of experience of disrupting government when they do not agree with it. As a consequence of the roadblock, a deal was struck between those on the Opposition and Government Benches, under which 92 hereditary peers would remain. Two would remain ex officio: the Lord Great Chamberlain and the Earl Marshal. There is no argument about those positions continuing to remain hereditary as long as we have them. I would advise all colleagues, whatever else they feel about the House of Lords, not to get into an argument about the future of the Lord Great Chamberlain or the Earl Marshal. They are both very good people who do difficult jobs and a great deal of work, which is mainly unsung. Under the deal, the other hereditary peers had to form themselves into electoral chambers and elect from their number a total of 90. At the time—as I will perhaps be reminded—my noble Friend Lord Irvine said:""I respond to the noble Lord, Lord Weatherill, by saying quite unequivocally to the House that that figure of 90 will be honoured by the Government throughout the period of the transitional House."—[Official Report, House of Lords, 11 May 1999; Vol. 600, c. 1094.]" I could well be asked why we are changing that arrangement at this stage. First, we are not requiring any current sitting hereditary peer to resign his place in the Lords. They will remain until they depart this mortal coil or until further measures are introduced. Secondly, as far as I am concerned, and, I think, as far as the House is concerned, 10 years ago there was no agreement whatsoever even within parties, still less between parties, about the future of the House of Lords. We had a royal commission, which did great work although its recommendations were not entirely accepted, and then abortive votes in this House in February 2003. We then had all-party talks between 2006 and 2007, the presentation of a White Paper in February 2007, which I was honoured to present to the House, and votes in this House that opted clearly, on an all-party basis, for an 80 or 100 per cent. elected Chamber and against all other alternatives. There was then an intensive period of further all-party talks that used that agreement as a template. I pay tribute to colleagues from all parties who took part in those talks. A further White Paper, published in July 2008, set out how that agreement would operate and further work is now being done—