My Lords, I am sure we are all agreed that during the past two years no one has been held for more than 14 days. I suspect that we all also agree that the fact that this power has not been used is not in itself an argument that it is not needed. However, to uphold the system of justice that we hold so dear and that we are determined, as it is crucial to our society, that terrorists and extremist will not take away from us, it is essential to be certain that that power is necessary.
This point was accepted by the Secretary of State for Justice in a recent lecture at Clifford Chance on 12 May, where he argued, I understand, that UK counterterrorism law was, ""built up in the wake of the 9/11 attacks on New York and the 7/7 attacks on London, should be reviewed and may need to be scaled back"."
He was reported as saying: ""There is a case for going through all counterterrorism legislation and working out whether we need it. It was there for a temporary period"."
This debate is important because it would be absolutely disastrous if we slipped into an easy habit of making temporary legislation de facto permanent and, thereby, in my estimation, giving the extremists a victory, which would be very unfortunate. I am one of those who believe that one of the things that we are defending in our society is our system of justice.
What is the justification for extending it to 28 days again? I noticed today that the Joint Committee on Human Rights has produced a report that raises some important questions in this respect. I wish that it had done it a little earlier. I know, because I have heard him say it, that my noble friend takes the findings of the Joint Committee on Human Rights extremely seriously. I am therefore a little surprised that he did not refer to its report. I hope that, before we conclude our debate, he will take up the points in its report and deal with them in detail.
One of the questions that the Joint Committee raises is whether the procedure by which the judge who authorises detention up to the maximum period during the 28 days provides sufficient, robust and adequate standards. Information can be withheld from the suspect and his lawyer and they can be excluded from hearing it. Another specific question that the Joint Committee on Human Right raises is whether this is compatible with the UK’s human rights obligations.
In the first year of the 28-day limit, three people were held for almost the maximum period, but that was before being released without charge. What detailed, careful analysis has been made by the Government of the lessons to be learnt from that? If those people were released without charge after almost 28 days, there must be lessons to be learnt if no charge was possible. I would suggest that the Joint Committee on Human Rights is absolutely correct to underline that to have a proper evaluation in a debate of this kind it is necessary to see such an evaluation by the Government in order that we cannot just be by good will persuaded, but by the force of intellectual argument persuaded that these exceptional powers are necessary.
What are the implications for the principle of the presumption of innocence, which I hope will remain central to our system of law, although I sometimes begin to become a little fearful? I believe that one of the great things about British law is that there is a presumption of innocence. What does all this amount to in terms of that very important principle for our whole society and its way of operating? What are the implications for a fundamental right to a fair hearing? It is absolutely central to our system of justice that people should know why they are being held and being charged. That goes back centuries in our history. It was fought for with tremendous commitment and courage in our history and evolution.
I am not saying that the system may not be necessary, but it is very important to hear detailed argument of why it remains important and not just to say, "Oh, we renewed it last year and the arguments are the same so we will renew it this year". It means that for yet another year we have not been operating by the standards we set ourselves. Therefore, to renew that for another year, we need to hear the arguments now and not just accept the arguments from last year. What are the implications for justice being seen to be done, which I have always again seen as central to our system of justice? What about the good will and co-operation of ethnic minority communities? From talking to police officers and others who are working on the front line with such communities, I know that co-operation and good will are absolutely essential in this vital task of holding the situation against extremists and preventing outrages against the population as a whole.
I raise these questions because I believe that we have heard a sincere argument by my noble friend. I do not question his sincerity, nor do I question his commitment to British justice. But it seems to me that if we are undertaking a review seriously, year by year, and mean that, as the Secretary of State for Justice suggested we should, it is important to hear much more detailed, rigorous arguments as to why we should continue overriding absolutely fundamental principles in our system of law.
Terrorism Act 2006 (Disapplication of Section 25) Order 2009
Proceeding contribution from
Lord Judd
(Labour)
in the House of Lords on Tuesday, 23 June 2009.
It occurred during Debates on delegated legislation on Terrorism Act 2006 (Disapplication of Section 25) Order 2009.
About this proceeding contribution
Reference
711 c1537-8 Session
2008-09Chamber / Committee
House of Lords chamberSubjects
Librarians' tools
Timestamp
2024-04-21 12:23:36 +0100
URI
http://data.parliament.uk/pimsdata/hansard/CONTRIBUTION_569865
In Indexing
http://indexing.parliament.uk/Content/Edit/1?uri=http://data.parliament.uk/pimsdata/hansard/CONTRIBUTION_569865
In Solr
https://search.parliament.uk/claw/solr/?id=http://data.parliament.uk/pimsdata/hansard/CONTRIBUTION_569865