Northern Ireland Bill (Allocation of Time)

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for setting the record straight, but that does not detract from my point. It was the occasion of the change that gave Sinn Fein an opportunity to cause problems, and that could happen again. We need to build in some contingency provision should such a situation occur and there is a sudden and unforeseen vacancy between now and the next Stormont elections, never mind 2012. The House should consider that if there is no prospect of an immediate appointment to the position—by which I mean two or three days, or at most a week—the default position should be that the Prime Minister would appoint someone with the power to appear before Members at Stormont and answer their questions, and to pilot legislation, although without voting rights. Such a provision is necessary, because at the moment of his or her demise the Justice Minister could be in the middle of taking legislation through Stormont, and that would have to be suspended, even though it might be important or even—dare I say?—urgent legislation. That is the reasoning behind amendment 25. If a vacancy for a Justice Minister were not filled with due dispatch, as would be the norm in every jurisdiction in the free world, someone would be appointed by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. If that provision were on the statute book, it would help to focus the minds of those who make up the body politic of Northern Ireland to resolve the issue themselves. After the 2011 Stormont election, it is possible that the Assembly will comprise only designated Unionists and designated nationalists. That could lead to paralysis again, so the sanction of dissolution, and thus another election, should exist if the new Stormont cannot resolve this Executive appointment. That sanction exists for the rest of the d’Hondt Executive, and this Bill ring-fences the Justice Minister by saying that the sanction would not apply. That would again invite those who are not in this Chamber to cause political aggravation. We need to strike out that provision, as amendment 26 provides. The parliamentary draftsmen used peculiar wording in the provision to the effect that the Department would be dissolved. That is surprising, because a Department does not dissolve. A Minister might disappear, and paralysis might ensue, but the actual functions of a Justice Department would still be there—the civil servants, the lawyers and the bricks and mortar. We need provision for 2012, because if the Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive were not able to resolve a post-2012 situation, the default position should be a reversion to direct rule for that particular Department, and it is only good practice to put that in the Bill. Those are the points that I wanted to raise and it seems to me that my amendment 27 would be a sensible solution. If we had had more time and a proper Committee stage, we could have explored this issue. In any event, those of us who have tabled amendments are inviting those in another place, before the Bill arrives there, to discuss these options with the Secretary of State and to prepare beefed-up amendments that encourage, coax and provide for the Northern Ireland Assembly to see that today’s intentions are enduring and that once the powers for justice and policing have been devolved, they will not be subject to a hiccup or a hiatus that might be unnecessarily caused by people who might not be here.