UK Parliament / Open data

Northern Ireland Bill (Allocation of Time)

Let me say at the outset that, on behalf of my party, I oppose the programme motion. The House has seen plenty of legislation that needed to be passed urgently, but here we have legislation being rushed through as if it were urgent when in reality there is no urgency whatsoever in terms of politics in Northern Ireland. Whether we like it or not, we still have no date for the devolution of justice—the Secretary of State has made that perfectly clear on many occasions—so why rush this legislation through now? Why should we not take a bit of time, not to delay it but to consider it properly? What harm could there be in that? In fact, it could only create better legislation. The other place is taking two days to consider the Bill, so why is this House being rushed and restricted to a single afternoon on a day that features a busy schedule? It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the Bill is being rushed through not because of its urgency, but because of its defects. Perhaps that is why copies of the consolidated legislation on which the Bill is largely based were not supplied to political parties until 9.16 pm on Monday, when amendments had to be tabled by 10.30 pm. That constitutes indecent haste, and prevents parties and Members from doing their job properly in the House. Members were left to trawl through the spaghetti of seven different Acts in that short time: the Northern Ireland Act 1998, the Northern Ireland (Monitoring Commission Etc.) Act 2003, the Northern Ireland (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2006, the Northern Ireland (St Andrews Agreement) Act 2006, the Justice and Security (Northern Ireland) Act 2007, the Justice (Northern Ireland) Act 2002, and the Justice (Northern Ireland) Act 2004. Not only does the Bill amend those Acts; it confounds some of the explanations and assurances that were given in the House during their passage. It contradicts previous understandings of, in particular, the way in which the devolution of justice would work, and it is defective in a number of respects. It means that the 2011 Assembly elections can be followed by an indefinite period during which there will be a Department of Justice without a Minister. Worse, it means that unless by May 2012 the Assembly has agreed to a permanent model for the devolution of justice, or the Secretary of State intervenes, the position will be the other way around: we shall have a Minister for Justice without a Department. That, of course, would be a very dangerous position. The absence of a Department of Justice would mean chaos in the sphere of justice and law in Northern Ireland. Perhaps that is why paragraph 5(2)(b) of schedule 1 allows the Secretary of State to introduce a fallback, although the First Minister and Deputy First Minister agreed that there would be no fallback. The fallback is the model of the Justice and Security (Northern Ireland) Act, which allows the DUP the very thing that Sinn Fein foolishly conceded in July 2008: a DUP veto over the appointment of a Minister for Justice "at all times". That, of course, could lead to further rows about who the Minister for Justice will be after 2012, potentially leaving the Department without a Minister again. All that might not matter if the future was in safe hands, but it is not. Both the DUP and Sinn Fein have played the devolution of justice card time and again for their own advantage, not for the common good. Indeed, just last year, while the world economy was falling apart around us, they could not agree to let the Executive meet to discuss the issue.

About this proceeding contribution

Reference

488 c858-9 

Session

2008-09

Chamber / Committee

House of Commons chamber
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