Political Parties and Elections Bill

I am glad to hear the Minister being suitably modest about his proposal, but I would have preferred him to have given a more positive reply to the suggestion made by the hon. Member for Battersea (Martin Linton) to have a review only once a Parliament, given the uplift suggested in the figures. Indeed, a revision once every two Parliaments might be appropriate, given the size of the initial uplift. There is also an interaction between new clause 19 and new clause 1. In a way, it makes no sense to decide on new clause 19 until we have decided on new clause 1, because we have to decide whether transparency will be the only mechanism for controlling donations, as it currently is. Where transparency is the only mechanism, there is a very strong case indeed for making that transparency provision as strong as possible and for keeping the limits as low as possible. However, if we were to adopt a cap, that would be the primary way of maintaining the public's confidence that—to use the Minister's words—people are not buying influence in politics. The transparency provisions would then provide a secondary way of maintaining that confidence. In those circumstances, one might come to different conclusions about where the transparency line should be drawn. I do not intend to divide the House on new clause 19, but given what the Minister said, I am rather more worried about it now than I was when we started our consideration of it. The hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr. Djanogly) said that he would like a Division on amendment 121. However, I will not be able to support him, and not just because of the technical reason—in fact, it is far more than a technical reason; it is an important reason—that I gave in an intervention. His amendment 121 would make the commission of a criminal offence dependent on what an administrative agency later decided about the circumstances that prevailed when the defendant acted. That can never be the right way to write a criminal offence. However, that is not my only reason. Rather, I am entirely puzzled about how the defence would work in the precise circumstances that the hon. Gentleman described. As was made clear in an intervention on him, the Bill suggests that""A person who knowingly or recklessly makes a false declaration under this section commits an offence."" However, after that he wants the Bill to say that it is not an offence if,""in the reasonable opinion of the Commission, the person had no intention of making, or by innocent mistake made, a false declaration"." I just cannot see how one can knowingly make a false declaration innocently. If someone makes a false declaration and they intend it to be false, it can never be made innocently. The only circumstances that have been raised are those where someone has been reckless, but what does recklessness mean in such circumstances? It means knowingly—consciously, subjectively—not caring whether what one says is true or false. I cannot see how that can ever be done innocently either. I am afraid, therefore, that I cannot support amendment 121. The crucial question in all the amendments that we are considering is public confidence.