Queen’s Speech

My Lords, I will focus on the proposed equality legislation. Since the introduction of the first anti-discrimination legislation over 40 years ago, the Church of England has been consistent in its support for the use of the law to combat the manifestation of prejudice and to promote equality and fairness. We believe that the law has a key role to play in countering discrimination. Any Bill which seeks to make anti-discrimination law more coherent and effective will therefore, in principle, be welcomed by the churches, faith communities and the myriad other organisations in the voluntary sector. If churches and faith organisations are cautious about the impact of this Bill, therefore, it is not because of its fundamental, underlying aim, which they support. Rather it is because of concerns about the potential for the Bill to impact adversely upon them and upon the whole voluntary sector in terms of the burdens imposed. It is also because of concerns that it may be seized upon as an opportunity by those who wish to confine freedom of religion to the purely private sphere. That a comprehensive review of the complex body of anti-discrimination law that has developed over the years is timely is undeniable. However, the case for further extending the scope of legislative provision in this area is less clear cut. In this, as in other areas, it is important not to expect the law to do more than it can reasonably be expected to do. Not everything that is wrong is best tackled by legislation, and it is doubtful whether the scale of the huge growth in the volume of legislation in recent years has been justified. It has certainly contributed to the more litigious nature of our society. Furthermore, while the protection of individuals’ rights is necessary for the common good, adding further legislation designed to protect those rights at this stage may be counterproductive. Given that a statutory framework is already in place, the emphasis might usefully now shift to implementation, education and advocacy in order more effectively to embed respect for rights in our culture. Anti-discrimination legislation is, by its very nature, complex and intrusive. By effectively placing the onus of proof on the defendant rather than the claimant and providing for unlimited damages in relation to successful claims, it already imposes a heavy burden on any organisation that employs staff. It is noteworthy that, while the Government's consultation on the reform of discrimination law touched on the possible additional burdens that fresh legislation might create for the public sector and businesses, it failed to recognise that the organisations least well placed to cope with evermore regulation are those in the voluntary sector. Most bodies in that sector, including the large number of small entities that make up the churches and other faith bodies, are essentially local, dependent on voluntary income and have, at most, a handful of paid staff and little by way of human resources or other professional support. Care must be taken to ensure that the Bill does not impose impossible additional burdens on these smaller organisations. A key aspect of the Bill to which we shall naturally be paying close attention from these Benches is how it handles the difficult and crucial area of how a proper balance should be struck between competing rights regarding religious belief. We are not alone in having been concerned at what has appeared to be a growing trend towards regarding religion and belief as deserving of a lesser priority in discrimination legislation than the other strands. The argument appears to be that, because religion and belief are susceptible to personal choice in a way that other strands are not, religion and belief should be subordinate to those other strands when they are in competition with one another. We believe that to be a false analysis. The preservation of religious freedom, including the right to manifest religious belief in all its diversity, remains a cornerstone of an open, liberal and tolerant society and was a constitutional principle in this country long before the Human Rights Act passed into law. Nor is religious equality achieved by the elimination in public institutions such as schools or local authorities of expressions of religious belief. That does not achieve equal respect for different religious groups and those of no religion; rather, it amounts to an enforced secularism that fails to respect religious belief at all. A genuinely generous equality allows the expression of religious belief not only by individuals but also by religious groups, and allows it to be expressed both in what they believe and in what they say and do. From that point of view, a key issue that will arise in the passage of this Bill will be the approach taken to the carrying forward of the various exceptions that Parliament has previously conferred on religious organisations in existing legislation. Success in dealing with that issue will depend on the way in which potentially competing rights are balanced. That this process is, and is seen to be, undertaken with rigour and objectivity is all the more important where it relates to sensitive issues, not only to do justice to those directly involved but to ensure that the legislation has the support of fair-minded people. Where Parliament is legislating for a situation in which the exercise of the right to freedom of religion conflicts with the human rights of other persons, its responsibility is, of course, to seek to ensure that the competing rights are balanced in the way required by Article 9.2 of the European convention. This requires that any restriction on the manifestation of religion or belief must genuinely be necessary; and that where it is imposed it must be no greater than is reasonably required to secure the proper protection of the other right. Finally, there is an important issue about the legislative process itself. It was a matter of concern to many of us that the previous Equality Bill was amended at a late stage to insert a power allowing the Secretary of State to make regulations extending protection from discrimination and harassment on grounds of sexual orientation to the provision of goods, facilities and services. Whatever our view on the issue itself, we very much hope that when the new Bill appears we shall not find that it confers similar powers to make detailed provision in contentious and sensitive areas by delegated legislation. Where such matters are involved, we are clear that they should be dealt with in the Bill so that they can be subjected to a proper process of detailed scrutiny, not least to enable Parliament to satisfy itself that any necessary balancing of potentially competing rights has indeed been conducted properly. We will want to play our proper part in such scrutiny.