Counter-Terrorism Bill

moved Amendment No. 2: 2: Before Clause 14, insert the following new Clause— ““National guidelines on fingerprint and sample database (1) The Secretary of State shall by regulations publish national guidelines for governmental agencies establishing— (a) a procedure by which a person can request a statement of what information relating to fingerprints and samples is held on them or on a dependent; (b) a procedure by which a person can request that such information held on them or a dependent is destroyed (c) the circumstances in which a request under paragraph (b) may be refused. (2) If a request made under paragraph (1)(b) is refused under paragraph (1)(c), the relevant agency shall write to the person setting out why such information will not be destroyed and when such circumstances as prevent it being destroyed may no longer apply. (3) In drawing up guidelines under subsection (1), the Secretary of State shall consult such bodies as he thinks appropriate. (4) Regulations under subsection (1) shall not be made until a draft copy is laid before, and approved by resolution of, both Houses of Parliament.”” The noble Baroness said: My Lords, we had an interesting debate in Committee on the retention of samples such as fingerprints and DNA. The Minister kindly followed that up with a comprehensive letter which included a fact-sheet compiled for the police on the retention and use of such samples. As I indicated in Committee, I was not particularly reassured by the Minister’s answers, and therefore I return today with the second of the two amendments I tabled at that stage. The aim of this amendment is to try to spark a national debate about the retention of samples and to inform the public about what information is being held on them. This amendment would require the Secretary of State to draft and lay before Parliament regulations governing the procedures by which people can discover what information is held about them and under what circumstances a request can be made by them to have samples taken during an investigation by the police destroyed. As we will see, there is no transparency in the current situation and the dice are severely loaded against innocent people being able to ensure that their most personal details are not kept indefinitely following their exclusion, either by a court or following a decision that there is no reason for them to be involved further in any inquiry. No one disputes the value of DNA and fingerprint information in identifying criminals and possibly terrorists, and that it has and will continue to make a useful contribution in pursuit of identifying and bringing to justice perpetrators of crime and terrorism. However, there is wide concern about the retention by the police of information on samples taken from a wide range of people during their inquiries which is then retained indefinitely on the police national computer. The provisions in this Bill add to those already in PACE 1984 and, as we now know, this legislation can be used to justify action over a wider range than counterterrorism purposes. Few innocent people will resent helping the police by giving samples whether they are innocent at the time or subsequently found to be, but they question, as we do, the justification for their personal identification material being held and for it to be difficult to find out how they can have it removed from the police national computer. There is an additional factor in that such information can now be transferred to other EU countries. The general assumption in those countries is that anyone whose details are held on the database is guilty or at least suspected of being associated with crime. Transparency is needed. The Minister was kind enough to identify where the current guidelines on the retention of DNA are set out, but their title, ““Retention guidelines for nominal records on the police national computer””, has clearly not been chosen with transparency in mind. However titled, they certainly did not pop up in a sample search of the internet; rather, they appeared on the website of the Association of Chief Police Officers and are, apparently, only for the guidance of the police. Members of the public would find it extraordinarily hard to make any headway through this maze. The guidelines are deeply worrying and make clear just how high a barrier the Government have imposed on DNA and fingerprint information ever being destroyed. The initial response to a request for destruction is an automatic refusal. The guidelines state: "““In the first instance applicants should be sent a letter informing them that the samples and the associated PNC record are lawfully held and that their request for deletion/destruction is refused””." But the chief police officer is then recommended to check with the DNA and Fingerprint Retention Project if the applicant persists. Appendix 2 makes it clear that, while the chief police officers have the discretion to authorise deletion of any specific data, it is, "““suggested that this discretion should only be exercised in exceptional cases””." It then goes on to say: "““Exceptional cases will by definition be rare””." Indeed they will be rare, for the case study given of when DNA information might be suitable for destruction is almost laughable. It is that if the police arrest every occupant of a building for murder following the discovery of a dead body and forcibly take DNA samples, but then discover that the dead body in fact died of natural causes and that no crime has been committed. That is then considered sufficiently a case where, possibly, DNA samples—taken from entirely innocent people—might be destroyed. The number of similar cases will not be enormous. In responding to similar amendments in Committee on 9 October 2008, at col. 384 of Hansard, the Minister prayed in aid to his conclusion that the retention of all samples taken helped identification in other criminal inquiries that some 8,500 individuals had been matched—he did not say in what timescale—with DNA taken from crime scenes involving some 14,000 offences which, he said, included more than 100 murders and attempted murders, 116 rapes, 68 other sexual offences and a number of other serious crimes. A briefing from GeneWatch in June this year drew attention to these or similar figures raised in a speech by the Prime Minister. It asked where the figures came from and pointed out that DNA matches are not successful prosecutions and that many matches occur with the DNA of individuals who are not perpetrators of crime. Only some matches, known as DNA detections, lead to someone being prosecuted for a crime and, "““it is not possible to provide figures for the number of convictions produced by DNA””." The first annual report in April of this year of the Ethics Group of the National DNA Database, a body set up by the Government, made 11 recommendations. They are all important but I shall not worry the House with them. However, for today’s purposes I shall draw attention to four of them as they are laid out in the report. Recommendation B states: "““For those members of the public who are believed to be innocent at the time of sampling and voluntarily donate their DNA to help the police with their enquiries, the presumption should shift to an expectation that these samples will be used only for the case under investigation, that the profile will not be loaded onto the NDNAD, and that the samples and all data derived from them will be destroyed when the case has ended””." Recommendation C says: "““There should be a specific consent form for competent adults who are not suspected of the crime under investigation when they agree to give a volunteer DNA sample””." Recommendation G is: "““A clearer, simpler and less cumbersome process needs to be put in place to enable those who wish to appeal against the decision of a chief constable to retain their DNA profile on the NDNAD””," the National DNA Database. Recommendation I states: "““Consideration should be given to further public clarification of the role of the NDNAD and reinforcement of the message that it is intended only to be used for criminal intelligence””." The Minister agreed during Committee that a debate surrounding all this was needed. We believe that our amendments today would give that opportunity. Regulations laying out the guidelines on the whys, wherefores and means of DNA and other samples being either retained on or removed from the police national computer that are clear, explicit and user-friendly are long overdue. Changes to the whole system during the passage of the Criminal Justice Act in 2001, which turned the assumption of the destruction of DNA at the end of a case into the assumption of retention, upset the presumption of innocence. The balance at present is not in favour of the innocent. Endless justifications may be put forward by those who believe that the current use of the database is too restricted and should be widened into one that is universal. However, it is perhaps now time to listen to the voices of those in favour of the current situation, and of those who are frankly appalled by the possibility of having their identifying materials held indefinitely by the police, and, with their aid, come to a balanced judgment. The Government’s justification for their current policy needs to be properly scrutinised. I beg to move.