Pensions Bill

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness for enabling us to talk about these measures and the statutory defence. Before I respond to the amendments in detail, I take this opportunity to deal with some of the issues raised in our debate on Monday, which are also relevant to this group of amendments. I do not seek to resile from the comments about considering this again at Third Reading, if appropriate, but I hope this might obviate or reduce the necessity of further consideration then. On reasonableness, we had a useful discussion about the concept of the Pensions Regulator’s reasonableness and, in particular, its public law obligations, its duties and the constraints which are intended to ensure that it does not behave unreasonably. Both the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, expressed concerns about the extent to which the regulator must consider the employer or connected parties when deciding whether it is reasonable to use its powers. In effect, they were querying whether the nature of the regulator’s objectives gave it something of a get-out-of-jail-free card when it came to behaving reasonably towards employers and other parties. I promised to write on this issue, but I hope that, in the interest of informing the rest of this afternoon’s discussions, I can discharge that obligation now. I emphasise that there is a legal requirement on the regulator to act reasonably with regard to those who do not feature in the main objectives set out in legislation. The public law obligation on the regulator means that it must not simply act reasonably toward those it was established to protect, but it must also act reasonably to other parties, including those it regulates. Furthermore, there are specific requirements on the regulator in legislation to behave reasonably; for example, Sections 38(7) and 43(7) of the Pensions Act 2004 both contain express provisions to consider the reasonableness of acting against a particular party. It is also important to remember that the regulator’s decisions can be appealed at the Pensions Regulator Tribunal and in the courts. I hope that comment has proved helpful to the noble Baroness. I wanted to place that on the record. The noble Baroness will also recall that we had some discussion about the operation of the word ““might”” in the statutory defence. The degree to which a person should consider the potential impact of an act on the pension scheme is a serious question, and it is one that we have considered carefully and discussed at length with stakeholders. The Government intend that the person should undertake a before-and-after comparison of the effect of the act on their pension scheme. We do not intend that the material detriment test and the defence which relates to it should necessitate a broad assessment of almost any adverse possibilities that could befall an employer and their pension scheme over a future period. The defence has been framed to require the employer to make a proportionate consideration of the effect of their act or failure to act. It may be helpful to talk through the detail here. Condition A, at new Section 38B(3), requires that the person should consider, "““the extent to which the act or failure might detrimentally affect in a material way the likelihood of accrued scheme benefits being received””." This is not a simple yes or no assessment. It requires serious consideration and contains two concepts: first, what is being considered is the extent to which the act or failure might have a detrimental effect—the key is that there must be a causal link between the act and the detriment; and, secondly, the extent to which there might be such an effect. This should be a standard risk analysis: how likely an event is must be weighed up with its likely impact. The noble Lord, Lord Oakeshott, was correct when he said that this should not be a straight 50-50 test.  A 20 per cent chance of a devastating impact on the scheme may be as serious as a 60 per cent chance of something with a more moderate impact. Industry should be comfortable and familiar with this, as it already forms the basis of most due diligence in the realm of pensions.  Further, it does not necessarily require an assessment at the very edges of the possible. The statutory defence was designed, with stakeholders, to deal with concerns about hindsight. Condition A operates with condition C and that latter condition says that the person should make the assessment with regard to the prevailing circumstances at the time. Therefore, that would not include anything that the person could not reasonably have expected. Thirdly, and briefly, we had an interesting discussion resulting from the noble Baroness’s query on why it was necessary for P to carry out due diligence themselves in circumstances that she described. I want to take the opportunity to expand on the points that I made on Monday. The legislation is clear that P has to undertake the due diligence but this does not mean that they necessarily have to mitigate the detriment themselves. The legislation requires P to take all reasonable steps to mitigate the detriment and it is intended that this obligation can be met by taking all reasonable steps to ensure that adequate mitigation is in place. I hope that that provides further clarity. Finally on these issues, the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, suggested that the power at line 54 of the proposed new schedule is entirely contained in the power at line 89. That is entirely correct. However, there is good reason for these two powers to be separate. The power in line 54 is a prescribing power to add to the list of factors, providing flexibility to add those factors that should apply in the interests of the employer as well as the pension scheme. It is not a broad power to amend or remove the existing factors in primary legislation, and the list of factors is still constrained by relevance in a particular case. Therefore, in the usual way, regulations made under this power would be subject to the negative procedure. The power in line 89 is a power to amend the existing factors and the scheme obligation provisions. This is a wider power that is intended to provide the flexibility that we have already discussed. As that power would permit primary legislation to be amended, we consider it appropriate to be subject to the affirmative procedure. Hence, it is a separate power. I am grateful for the chance to put those further points on those matters on the record. I turn to the substance of the amendments. They would amend the provisions dealing with how the defence relates to a series of acts, and in particular a group of acts selected by the defence. The regulator can apply the material detriment test to a series of acts it selects. In order to be even handed, the party to the defence can similarly raise a defence in relation to a group of acts that the party selects. The amendments provide an opportunity to set out how the defence will operate in relation to groups of acts chosen by the parties. It is our intention that defendants should have the opportunity to demonstrate that their actions in relation to a group of acts, when taken as a whole, were reasonable. When considering conditions A and B it is possible to argue that due consideration was given to the cumulative detrimental impact of a group of acts and that reasonable steps were taken to eliminate or mitigate the potential detrimental effects of that group of acts. However, condition C requires that the defendant considers the relevant circumstances prevailing at the relevant time, so defendants are required to consider each act within the group individually when considering condition C. The amendment tabled by the noble Baroness opens up significant risk by removing any requirement that conditions A and B be met for the defence. I accept that it is a probing amendment in relation to a group. It also results in different requirements for acts that are dealt with individually and those that are dealt with in groups. In addition the amendments make the defence unworkable in relation to a group chosen by the party. It requires that condition C should be met by the group as a whole. However, as I have explained, condition C is based on having regard to the relevant circumstances at the relevant time. As the amendment does not address how the relevant time would be determined in relation to a group, it is rendered unworkable. This would make the defence fail to work when it was raised in relation to more than one act or failure. A party would therefore be restricted to raising the defence in relation to each act or failure individually, which is the other opportunity under the defence, even when the regulator could look at a series as a whole. The amendment effectively removes a desirable flexibility for employers and other parties who may wish to raise the defence in relation to a group of acts for efficiency reasons. I hope that that helps the noble Baroness. I have spent more than a few hours trying to get my head round the complexities of this process, and would be more than happy to meet her to share them with her. I have tried to explain why the test is set out as it is and why following the path she suggests would not work in practice.