Counter-Terrorism Bill

My Lords, I have had to do a little rewriting—I hope that I can read it. I listened with great respect to the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, who of course knows far more than I do about the workings of the terrorist world today. I respect her concern for our freedoms and our rights as citizens—rights that are shared by those who are under arrest. I have heard those views expressed right across this House, starting with my own Front Bench. I, too, care about human rights. Where we differ is that I believe that, given a ruthless enemy—and we are talking not about Muslims, but about terrorists—we need to be absolutely sure that we have made it possible to charge and identify those people and those who are working with them. The police sometimes arrest suspects because it would be dangerous to let things run further. I assume that they initially have good reasons for believing that they have arrested someone who is at the least involved in a potential threat to the state. Why else would they take such a major political risk? However, there will be others, too—part of the terrorist diaspora. We surely cannot afford not to try to cut off all the tentacles of the octopus. The US Senate 9/11 commission report gave several telling examples of terrorists identified too late because of the simple fact of delays in answers from often friendly but slow-acting services. One of those cases involved a close link to the group that eventually carried out that bombing. I give that as an example of why I believe that the law should make it possible to get an extension of time if that is judged necessary. I am not saying that it has to happen; I am saying that, if it needs to happen, it ought to be able to happen. Therefore, I remain committed to the urgent need to extend the powers on pre-charge detention seven days at a time when asked for, for up to 42 days. The enemy is not the IRA but a global, amorphous organisation that uses rare forms of Arabic to communicate. It is highly skilled in new communications technology and its tentacles reach into Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Pakistan and Malaysia. The men and women with the necessary linguistic and professional knowledge to extract intelligence from vast quantities of material seized are hard pressed. One Islamist case, in which 200 officers were needed to collect the evidence, yielded 400 computers, more than 8,000 CDs and DVDs and 25,000 other exhibits. As the noble Baroness, Lady Ramsay, said, there is a problem with the liaison services. Once the team has identified a lead, it must go to them to confirm that identity, and many of the targets use multiple identities. The inquiries are often highly delicate politically. Carefully developed professional relationships have to be used to secure co-operation. The liaison services have an agenda of their own and, even if they respond promptly, they may be understaffed and the answer may—almost certainly will—take weeks rather than days. Can it be right to lose crucial evidence because it comes too late, when we are only seeking an extension of a week at a time, with the approval of a senior judge and the DPP, and only if it is necessary? Who is going to ask for it if it is not necessary? I strongly support the appointment, with the approval of the DPP, of a second senior judge to review the position weekly after 28 days, as has been advocated by such experienced men as Sir Swinton Thomas and the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew. However, I utterly oppose the requirement for the Home Secretary, after securing the approval of the judges and the DPP, to bring the decision to the House of Commons and to provide the chairmen of the Home Affairs, Human Rights and Intelligence and Security Committees with a copy of the report that she received from the DPP, asking for the extension, and a copy of the legal advice. Apparently, she must then lay a statement before Parliament that, "““must not include any material that might prejudice the prosecution of any person””." I would not like to be the person who writes that report. Surely the defence would have a cast-iron case for declaring a fair trial impossible. How can Parliament reach a valid decision? Why do we employ highly skilled intelligence services, judges with experience and probity and considerable human resources, yet still require Parliament to make a decision on a seven-day extension already reviewed and approved by not one but two judges? My other concern has been and will be the use of intercept evidence. The Chilcot committee, to which I was privileged to give evidence, agrees with the principle that intercept as evidence should be introduced, but recommends that the Government should undertake at the outset to take action should practical operation of the regime mean that the operational requirements, which the committee set out extremely fairly, could no longer be met. The report recognises the operational and resource problems, which is extremely reassuring. However, there are substantial fears in the intelligence community that essential national security interests might be damaged. It is difficult to discuss those in public, which is why the Chilcot committee was such a splendid thing. There is a need to make it clear that, "““in no circumstances would there be a sacrifice of the essential security requirements the report lists””." I hope that that wise advice is heeded and that the nine points of principle produced by the Chilcot inquiry will be dealt with by the same committee. The report, incidentally, regrets that the decision to amend RIPA to allow the use of intercept evidence in coroners’ courts came too late for the committee to consider. That is all that I shall say. I have found the debate fascinating, but I do not move from my position. I shall vote for 42 days.