Counter-Terrorism Bill

My Lords, in her excellent maiden speech, the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, said that there should be no political partisanship in questions of national security; I agree. I will go further and say that when one comes from a group that is likely to be most affected by those measures of legislation, we should, nevertheless, try to set aside those aspects to obtain the best legislation for all. Three of us from those communities are speaking in the debate today. I shall start by reassuring the noble Lord, Lord Howarth of Newport, that neither the noble Lord, Lord Sheikh, nor I, nor the noble Lord, Lord Ahmed, from what I know of him—although I do not have his permission to say this—would in any measure try to effect any special pleading for Muslims in dealing with any legislation, whether it is on counterterrorism or not. We come to this House to speak in a non-partisan way, to deal in a non-partisan fashion with the matters that we see on the Order Paper, and to do so in the interests of all in the country, not for our community. First, I shall consider how we deal with extremism in this country. The noble Lord, Lord West of Spithead, touched on political extremism as the precursor to terrorism, so I shall touch on that too. In the past four years, much has been made of the issue of home-grown terrorists. The implication is that there is something particular to Muslim communities here in Britain; some special characteristics that lead to radicalisation, which in turn results in the violent acts that we saw in 2005 and several attempts since. In taking the perspective of British Muslim exceptionalism, the starting premise is that, if we can therefore employ the right remedies, and if somehow we can change the drinking water in this pool, we will sort out the problem and root out terrorism from among those people. However, no unique features distinguish young British Muslims from those in Canada, the United States, France, Spain, Germany, or indeed Pakistan or Algeria, where people are subjected to equally horrific attacks. On the whole, while circumstances may vary, a clear picture is emerging that the terrorists are motivated by a powerful ideology. It may be a twisted ideology, but it resonates with those who are prone to violence. Its justification is in terms of righteousness in the face of authoritarian rulers and Western double standards. It juxtapositions modernity with powerlessness; it pitches complexity against literalist clarity. It has its adherents, who use our liberty and freedoms to their advantage. The question for us here in Britain is whether it is something against which we can hermetically seal ourselves through passing more and more laws. In my view, we cannot. The global jihadi movement that al-Qaeda has launched will partly resolve itself as conflict in the Middle East and other Muslim countries abates, and it will lose its pull as new generations come up with new ideas from within Islam itself. Muslim societies are best placed to deal with modernity. The issue before us is the extent to which we believe that more powers given to the state at the expense of its citizens will indeed keep them safer. There will always be more powers that might help. As one set of laws is passed, anomalies come up. New plots and the trials that follow reveal the existence of new loopholes. We face the possibility that every time we add a fresh bolt to the door, we find that the screw is too short, the hinges are too loose and it might yet be possible that the door will smash open. So we forge bigger and bigger bolts. That is called the politics of fear. That is where we substitute a grown-up debate with citizens about the duty to keep them safe with midnight whispers of barbarians at the gate. In saying that, I do not deny the need for new laws and additional powers to protect us. Some of the provisions in this Bill, which appear to be so potentially far-reaching and so disproportionate in terms of the balance between liberty and security, have caused concern, as we have already heard today in this House. I shall turn to the measures that I hope we will be able to look at more carefully in Committee. Several noble Lords have spoken of the clauses on the extension of pre-charge detention to a maximum of 42 days. I will not dwell on that, other than to say that it would signal a dramatic change in the principles of internment and it would have implications well outside our borders. It will be more than just lowering the bar; it will effectively be placing the bar on the floor. There are other measures, too, which appear to be overly broad. In Part 1, my concern is with the powers to gather information and the changes where it would become a criminal offence to obstruct the gathering of information. I will be seeking to question the extent to which language or cultural barriers could inadvertently result in obstruction charges, and to secure safeguards in relation to those who might be subject to its implications. I will also be seeking to probe clauses to do with the taking and holding of fingerprints and non-intimate samples from those subject to control orders. Also of concern are clauses that deal with the sharing of information with foreign agencies. The provisions in Part 4 deal with notification requirements and foreign travel restrictions. I recognise that some of those measures may well be necessary in light of a particular individual’s offence and the risk of recidivism. The problem with the current drafting of Clauses 51 to 68 is that the clauses would catch all those convicted of a terrorism offence, or an offence with a terrorism connection, if they were given a minimum of a one-year sentence. Those requirements are not based on a risk assessment that is framed to deal with an individual’s circumstances and are therefore capable of being disproportionate when applied so broadly. I shall turn here to the Home Office’s equality impact assessment on the Bill. It found, unsurprisingly for some of us, that there is a perception among the Muslim community that terrorism legislation targets them as a group rather than as individuals. It is the scope of measures such as those in Part 4 that lends credence to that perception. The requirements are not headline grabbing, but they are well known about in the community. In Committee, I will be seeking to ensure that they are as narrow and specific as they can be, in order that they are targeted at individuals, in light of individual circumstances, rather than at anyone who came into the criminal justice system at a certain point in their life, however wrong they might have been at that point. There would be little scope for rehabilitation if we were to allow the measures to stand as they do currently. Seven minutes is too short a time to say anything detailed about a Bill of this scope. In ending, all I can add is that we find ourselves in a long-term ideological struggle that is not of our making; all that we can do is deal with it as wisely as we can. I wish, as much as the security services might do, that there was a silver bullet. There is not. In its absence, we will have to secure the most effective and proportionate responses in law. The Bill as it stands does not do that.