Crossrail Bill

moved Amendment No. 9: 9: Clause 35, page 25, line 23, leave out from ““agreement”” to end and insert— ““(a) which relates wholly or mainly to the provision of one or more Crossrail passenger services, or (b) which relates wholly or mainly to the provision of one or more other services for the carriage of passengers by railway where— (i) the services run wholly or partly on the route of Crossrail, and (ii) the services are likely to be subject to substantial disruption because of the construction of Crossrail.”” The noble Lord said: I will not take quite so long this time, but I will take a little time. Clause 35 disapplies the prohibition in the Railways Act 1993 on a public sector operator acting as a franchisee, which potentially provides flexibility to accommodate a public sector operator of Crossrail passenger services, if that is considered desirable. This group of amendments, consisting of Amendments Nos. 9, 10 and 12, extends that flexibility in two respects that I shall explain in a moment. Constructing and bringing Crossrail into operation will be challenging, and flexibility is required to achieve that in the least disruptive way possible. Conventional private sector franchises are best suited to stability, although they can and do cope with a degree of change. However, the point will come in relation to the Crossrail project when, for a period, it may be more practicable and cost effective to manage the passenger train operation in the public sector rather than the private sector. It may help if I give five key examples that are likely to be encountered in sequence as the project progresses. The first example is in the construction period, during which there will inevitably be some disruption for suburban services, which might be better managed as part of the project. This example relates to the amendments, which I shall return to in a moment. The second example is later during construction, but before the new central tunnel section is opened. It may be useful to commission the new Crossrail rolling stock by using it for some existing suburban services that will later be subsumed by the Crossrail services, which would enable some trialling. The third example is once Crossrail services start running through the central tunnel section. The services are likely to be phased in, so there must be close co-ordination with the phasing out of the suburban services that Crossrail services replace. The fourth example is that ancillary services may sensibly be operated along with Crossrail services. This example also relates to the amendments, to which I shall return in a moment. The final example is the stabilisation period. Since Crossrail is an entirely new service, it will only be during this period that performance data can be produced on which a competitive franchising process is based. Such a competition in the phasing-in and stabilisation periods could result in franchise bids factoring in at least some element of project risk, which may be better managed as part of the project delivery. I return to the amendments, which, as I said, do two things. First, proposed new subsection (1)(a) enables ancillary or complementary services to be included within a Crossrail public sector train operation. It does so by allowing a Crossrail public sector franchise to be mainly, rather than exclusively, for Crossrail services that run through the central tunnel. That is to aid franchise mapping, so as to avoid services closely related to Crossrail services becoming orphans because they do not logically fit into another group of services that are franchised. Secondly, proposed new subsection (1)(b) provides for a public sector operation for services that are likely to suffer substantial disruption because of the construction of Crossrail. Those services might be those where significant compensation would have to be paid as a consequence of the disruption to some of the services in the franchise. Better value for money may be achieved by managing those services as part of the overall project delivery. Whether this is done, and at what time, would need to be decided by the Secretary of State, taking account of not just the project’s interests but also wider policy in relation to franchising. Once the likelihood of disruption to those services has subsided, or the interim Crossrail public sector operation is no longer considered useful, then the expectation is that the services will be procured from the private sector, on current plans, by means of a concession let by Transport for London. However, the department and TfL have agreed to review whether it would make better sense for the DfT rather than TfL to be the franchising authority. For a DfT-let franchise, the expectation is that the Crossrail services would also be procured from the private sector. Nevertheless, flexibility is retained in the clause in case some future circumstance applies—we are talking here about unforeseeable events more than 10 years hence—that meant that the Secretary of State found it necessary to take on the franchise and to operate it in the public sector for a time. The clause, and this group of amendments to extend the flexibility that it provides, is a practical and sensible measure to help ensure that Crossrail is constructed and brought into operation in a way that is both efficient and effective. I beg to move.