Secure Training Centre (Amendment) Rules 2007

My Lords, a while ago in Grand Committee, the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, and I were talking about the impact of Section 9 on the children of destitute asylum seekers. Now here we are in the main Chamber, talking about the impact of some of the measures affecting children in our secure training centres. I listened carefully to the arguments advanced by the noble Lord, Lord Warner. I shall put my side and explain what I think are the problems. There are two central issues regarding the statutory instrument. The first is whether physical restraint should be used against children to reinforce staff instructions in circumstances that do not involve the risk of harm to people, damage to property or escape. The statutory instrument would allow the use of physical restraint when none of those issues applied, for reasons of ““good order and discipline””. The second issue is whether techniques involving the deliberate infliction of pain to the nose, ribs or thumb should be used in circumstances where none of those risks applies. The statutory instrument would also allow that to happen. The Government argue that staff should be able to use physical restraint as a last resort to enforce staff instructions in some circumstances. To reassure their critics, they point to the Youth Justice Board’s code of practice, which says at paragraph 10.4: "““Restrictive physical interventions must not be used as a punishment or merely to secure compliance with staff instructions””." However, the code of practice does not have statutory force. The statutory instrument does, and its phrasing would allow the use of restraint merely to secure compliance with staff instructions. It would legalise the use of restraint to ensure ““good order and discipline”” without any further definition or restriction of the scope of that phrase. In a Written Ministerial Statement in another place, Bridget Prentice MP stated: "““We would not anticipate that a refusal to comply with an instruction alone would constitute a breach of good order and discipline. However, where the circumstances of the refusal are such that the refusal to comply with an instruction has wider implications for the safe running of the centre, undermining the general authority of the staff or putting safety or security at risk in some other way, then a genuine concern about good order and discipline may arise””.—[Official Report, Commons, 21/6/07; col. 113WS.]" However, none of that is spelled out in the statutory instrument, which simply legitimises the use of restraint to ensure good order and discipline. Even if the Government’s view as reflected in that Statement were incorporated into the statutory instrument, it includes the phrase, "““undermining the general authority of the staff””," which could be used to justify the use of force in just about any situation in which a young person refused to obey an instruction. In a stakeholder briefing on 27 June 2007 entitled ““Restraint in Secure Training Centres””, the Youth Justice Board argued that in such circumstances a refusal to comply with staff instructions could put other young people at risk of physical harm. But those circumstances are already covered by the present law, which allows restraint to prevent injury to the young person or other people. The briefing then goes on to argue that restraint could be justified if a young person refused to stop swearing at a teacher because of the disruption caused to the education of other young people. This is an astonishing proposition. Pupils in urban comprehensive schools not infrequently disrupt the class by swearing at teachers, but their staff are not empowered to use physical restraint techniques against them as a way of preventing disruptions. Why does the Government’s stance on this matter cause such acute concern to so many practitioner organisations, including Nacro, of which I am the president? The first reason is that dealing with young people in ways that involve the use of force in situations where they do not pose a risk to people or property seems a disproportionate response, as spelled out by many noble Lords. Secondly, it sets an example that force is the way to resolve situations, which runs counter to the messages that we should be imparting to young offenders. Thirdly, a high proportion of young people in secure training centres have suffered physical or sexual abuse from adults in the past. Manhandling them through physical restraint can cause them extreme distress, bringing back memories of what they have suffered at abusive adults’ hands. Let us turn to the specific issue of painful methods of restraint. The Youth Justice Board’s stakeholder briefing appears to agree with its critics that painful distraction techniques should not be used where there is no risk of harm to the young people or others. The briefing says: "““Distraction techniques in particular may only be used when a person is at risk of harm””." However, there is nothing in the statutory instrument to restrict the use of painful techniques to these circumstances. If the Government’s stance is the same as that of the Youth Justice Board as stated in the stakeholder briefing, why do they not amend the statutory instrument to make it clear that distraction techniques cannot be used unless there is risk of harm to a person? It cannot be right to frame restraint powers in such a manner that they would legally allow practices of which the Youth Justice Board rightly says it does not approve. A number of noble Lords have talked about Adam Rickwood. His suicide followed a few hours after he was instructed, not because he was threatening to assault someone or injure himself, but because he was refusing to go to his room. Unless the statutory instrument is withdrawn or amended, it will enshrine in law the right of staff of secure training centres to behave in the same way to other vulnerable young people with predictable and potentially tragic results.