Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Bill

My Lords, for a very few years in the late 1960s, I, too, had the pleasure of being a junior Minister in the Home Office, and I wholeheartedly endorse the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Elton. I have not taken part in the earlier discussions on the Bill, having been absent for unavoidable reasons. With great respect, I do not think that this is in any way a choice between one set of alternatives and another set of statutory alternatives, one being superior to the other. The amendment rests absolutely on the solid rock of principle. It is a question of absolute principle, which has been articulated by so many Members of the House. There can be no higher trusteeship than that which rests on the shoulders of an authority that is responsible for persons in custody. That trusteeship is of so high a level that I cannot describe it in any terms other than absolute. The next question then is whether, in those circumstances, a distinction should be drawn between the position of governmental authority or governmental agency and that of an employer in the area of responsibility as defined by the Bill. It should not be; it must not be. The message that would be broadcast by such a decision would be that, somehow or another, powerful interests are able to have their own way and that in some way or another the life of a prisoner is not as valuable in the eyes of the community as that of persons who are not prisoners, or that some exemption should be made for the absolution of government that has never been properly proven or established. For those reasons, I wholeheartedly support the amendment.