Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Bill

My Lords, I have spoken before on this issue, always in support of my noble friend Lord Ramsbotham, and I support him again in Motion A1. Like him and others, I am acutely aware of the constitutional importance and significance of the game of ping-pong that we play, and the ramifications of what might happen if we return this Bill to another place once again. Not to have this clause in the Bill would indicate a lack of care and concern for those who are in a place where they are almost more vulnerable than in any other place within our constitution, and in a place where duty of care is absolutely paramount. As I have asked before, and ask again, what message would be sent within this country, within the organisation and outside, and within our borders if we do not include this matter? In particular, what message would it send to those countries which we seek to influence at a particularly sensitive time in the world’s history when we are trying to demonstrate that the western democracies of this world have more to offer than they do? I wonder how they would see this exclusion. As a young student reading law at university, and later as a young police officer beginning to grapple with the requirements of that job, it was emphasised to me that arrest and detention of a citizen is absolutely fundamental within the constitutional framework. We are talking about people detained in prisons and in police cells, although more are detained in prisons. I have said before and say again in preamble that a prime test in any civilised country is how you deal with those who are locked up by the state. We should keep that at the forefront of our minds. We know that it is rare in this country for things to go wrong, but things can and do go wrong, and when they do one must ask what recourse those people or their relatives have. We believe that police objections have borne on the Home Office’s decision. From memory, I think that was mentioned about three months ago during our debate. The Association of Chief Police Officers provided me with a letter which it sent to the Home Office. It is undated but I understand that it was sent very shortly before 11 May this year on behalf of ACPO. It is a short letter. If you take away the heading and the spare space on the back of the second page, it would come to exactly—I have measured it—one side of close-typed A4. That is the weight and the length of the police response on this matter. It pains me to say that it is a poorly constructed letter. It is more a statement of position than anything else. It comprises seven paragraphs, four of which state the obvious. I refer to statements such as one that says that the police have to, "““deal with difficult and dangerous incidents””." It goes on to say that they have to take, "““critical decisions whilst under extreme pressure””." We know that. The letter states that they are responsible for, "““those who pass through police custody””," who, "““are amongst society’s most volatile and vulnerable, often after they have been failed by agencies better equipped to provide appropriate care and support””." It goes on to say: "““It is quite right that the police should be held to account””." I suspect that we would quarrel with none of that. The letter concludes with the rather strange three lines: "““Extending the provisions of the Corporate Manslaughter Bill would only serve to impose an unnecessary additional level of scrutiny and, in practice, could serve to foster a ‘risk averse’ approach to operational policing””." Only one paragraph in this very short letter could reasonably be called an argument and that, as I said, is more a statement of a position. The police case appears to be that they are trying to distinguish their position vis-à-vis custody from the position vis-à-vis operational policing. Noble Lords may remember that, under Clauses 4 and 5, operational policing and indeed operations by the Armed Forces, which are very similar in some respects, are specifically excluded from the Bill. I spoke in support of that, as did other noble Lords, and it is not now a matter of dispute or debate. However, the police are concerned about the point at which operational policing ends and custody begins. That is what appears to be inserted in one short paragraph of the letter. My own guess—not tritely—is that custody could begin when the cell door shuts or slightly before, when the charge is accepted. I would be happy to leave that to judicial decision. Your Lordships might wish to insert such a description into the Bill, even at a late stage, but I do not think it needs to go in. On reflection and after a long history with the Home Office, I am confused—others may well be too—how on so many times the Home Office has rejected well argued, heavily argued and lengthily argued submissions by the police on a range of issues, but it is prepared to stand its ground on this one, which I have already sadly described as a poorly argued paper. I can understand where the police are coming from. They must have fears on that division between operational and custody. I understand the position, but I regret that I do not support the ACPO line. I support everything that has been said—although I will not repeat it—by the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, most of which applies to prisons, but some of which can also apply to those in police cells. I urge your Lordships’ support for the Motion.