Armed Forces, Army, Air Force and Naval Discipline Acts (Continuation) Order 2007

My Lords, I do not want to delay approval of the continuation order for the Armed Forces Act and the service discipline Acts because, of course, continuation is essential for the carrying on of good order and military discipline of our Armed Forces. Excellent work has been done in your Lordships’ House and the other place on the Armed Forces Act and I am happy about the transition arrangements. However, as we are talking about discipline, I wanted to ask the Minister a straight question—as I feel that I am entitled to do—on the disciplinary actions of the unfortunate maritime incident which occurred in the Gulf and on which there have recently been two reports. I should make it clear that although I was one of the people put forward to receive a briefing on this, the short-notice meeting called at the Ministry of Defence was called on Garter day, so I could not attend, and I have not been given an opportunity to read either of the reports. I know only what the media have been in a position to tell everyone, which is not a great deal. I thought it was standard practice in the Royal Navy—and I had admiration and sympathy for my naval colleagues on this—that if one of Her Majesty’s vessels had been hazarded, as that combat raider from HMS ““Cornwall”” undoubtedly had, to say nothing of the reputation of the Royal Navy, the senior officer on the spot—the captain of the ship—was automatically court-martialled, even though there may have been extenuating circumstances covering his responsibility, and however unlucky he may have been. At the court martial, which would have clarified the situation, he would have had a chance to explain his case, which might mean that he got away with a reprimand or he might be acquitted. However, there was never any doubt about where, ipso facto, the responsibility lay and where the buck stopped. Can the Minister enlighten me about why, when damaging errors of judgment were made in the event and its aftermath, which I understand the report highlights, which, if they had not been made, would have prevented this incident happening or least prevented it ending as it did, no one has been held directly responsible? This sets an extremely bad example to our service men and women who are beginning to be infected with the cult that these days no one takes responsibility for anything. Even if they do—the Secretary of State said that it was his responsibility, but that really meant nothing, merely that he was not taking responsibility, and in this particular case I do not think he should—if nothing is done in terms of personal position, then it means nothing at all. This issue is wider than the incident itself. When the Foreign Office made a small error of judgment in not forecasting the Argentine invasion of the Falklands in time, the whole hierarchy of the Foreign Office—the Secretary of State, all his Ministers and the Permanent Secretary—resigned because they had got it wrong. How very different it is today. Clear lines of responsibility are essential for the successful conduct of operations, with everyone clear about what they are responsible for and prepared to take the rough with the smooth. How can the Minister justify the complete exoneration of those who should have done in the first place all the—