Offender Management Bill

I understand how the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee works. My point is simply this: that committee agreed with the Government’s interpretation of what was required in terms of process and procedure. It did not suggest that the super-affirmative process was appropriate for dealing with this issue. In that context, the amendment goes much further than the normal tried-and-tested procedures and seeks to apply a super-affirmative procedure. It seeks, in so doing, to impose an unnecessary delay by specifying that a draft order must be laid for at least 60 days before both Houses may debate the order. Further, it seeks to impose on both Houses by requiring them to approve a report that sets out what will be in the draft order. Both Houses would then be required to approve the same proposals, in the same Session, as set out in the order. As the noble Baroness has conceded, the amendment was inspired, perhaps in her mind, by the super-affirmative resolution procedure set out in Section 18 of the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006, which is in many respects similar to the power proposed here. But the circumstances for which the super-affirmative power in the 2006 Act was designed bear no resemblance to the circumstances that we are dealing with here. The Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006, which I had the privilege of taking through your Lordships’ House, enables the Government to use secondary legislation to amend retrospectively primary legislation that made no provision for such amendment when it was passed by Parliament in the first place. It was designed for a different purpose altogether. To reflect the wide-ranging nature of this power and to provide appropriate safeguards, the Act therefore followed the super-affirmative procedure first developed under the Regulatory Reform Act 2001, repealed by the later Act, which operates along the sort of lines set out in the amendment. Our situation is entirely different. Whereas the 2006 Act introduced powers to amend primary legislation for purposes that were not envisaged at the time that that legislation was passed, our intentions are open and clear. Indeed, this is the very purpose of Clause 12: to provide an order-making power to enable the subsequent repeal, in whole or in part, of Clause 4. So a super-affirmative procedure is quite inappropriate here. Indeed, it is ironic that a procedure that was intended to facilitate deregulation and the lifting of burdens should here be used with the aim of maintaining them. I ask the Committee to think carefully about the implications of applying this procedure in circumstances that are so different from the ones that it was originally designed for. Quite aside from its impact on the probation provisions, it could set a most unhelpful precedent more widely and risk undermining the clear and well understood parliamentary procedures that have stood the test of time. Before noble Lords consider this further, I ask them to reflect carefully. Under the normal affirmative procedure, the order will be laid in draft before both Houses, and the Government will be required to make their case to both Houses before the order can be made. When Ministers come to do so, they will need to fulfil the commitments that have been made during this Bill’s passage through both Houses: to demonstrate that the appropriate safeguards are in place to alleviate the concerns expressed during that passage; and to present evidence as to how the new arrangementsare working in practice. In fact, my right honourable friend the Home Secretary gave just such an undertaking during the Third Reading debate in another place. Whether a formal report is the best vehicle for doing so is a judgment that will need to be taken at that time, taking into account the specific circumstances under which the draft order has been laid before both Houses. It is not something that can be rigidly codified in advance, in ignorance of those circumstances or, indeed, of what the exactly the Government propose in the order. The bottom line is that, if either House is not satisfied with the case that the Government bring to the House at that time, it will not support the order and the restriction will not be lifted. This has been a valuable debate and has provided an opportunity to pull together a number of important issues, in particular the issue of conflict of interest. We do not believe that there is an intrinsic conflict of interest for private companies in writing pre-sentence reports, which is undoubtedly one of the issues that troubles noble Lords. The writing of reports will be done under the very strict guidelines already in place to prevent any similar potential conflicts of interest under current arrangements, when the local board is in the position of both advising on and implementing the sentences of the court. However, we recognise that we have to get the system right before opening up this sensitive area of work to other sectors. That is why we have added this clause to the Bill. In any case, the awarding of a sentence—that being an issue raised in this context—will remain entirely at the discretion of the sentencer. The noble Lord, Lord Dholakia, asked whether there had been consultation with the judiciary. There has been very wide consultation on the probation proposals. It is partly in recognition of the concerns about conflicts of interest that Clause 4 was inserted in the first instance. We are clear on this. We believe that we have a robust procedure that is tried and tested. It will inevitably mean that we must bring forward and carefully explain to both Houses the basis of our decision to move forward in the contestability field. The noble Baroness has drawn together in essence a procedure designed for an entirely different purpose, under legislation intended broadly speaking to deregulate rather than over-regulate. I invite the Committee to consider its position carefully before it decides to agree or take on board the proposal made in the amendment. I hope that, having heard what I have said, the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw her amendment.