Legal Services Bill [Lords]

I want to make some more progress. In the other place, arguments were made about areas that I do not think can be advanced as equivalents. The question was asked, ““Why should we do this? Is it not the same as the head of Ofcom being appointed by Rupert Murdoch or the chairman of the Competition Commission being the chairman of Tesco?”” Those arguments are not well made. The independence of the legal profession is significant: it is a cornerstone of the rule of law and needs to be handled cautiously. The Government seek to give assurance by saying that the appointment process will be conducted according to the Nolan principles and that it will be conducted diligently and transparently. The concern, though, is whether that is enough and whether the Government should have gone further in another place. There are legitimate questions and concerns. Is it significant that the Government resisted the amendment saying that the appointment should be made in accordance with the rules applicable at the relevant time? Why did they resist that amendment so vigorously? Surely a justified concern is properly dealt with by the Lord Chief Justice having the concurrent responsibility for an appointment. The appointment process also raises other questions. The Government have not yet made clear how it should properly be carried out and where formal responsibility for appointment lies. It will be essential to ensure that the appointment panel is demonstrably independent of Government. Under the ordinary procedures for public appointments, the panel would no doubt have been chaired by a senior official in the Department for Constitutional Affairs, but that would not be satisfactory in a context in which independence from Government is paramount for consumers up and down this land. The concern about independence goes further than the appointment process and relates, among other things, to the powers exercised by the legal services board. I urge the Minister to think again as the Bill proceeds to Committee and to take seriously the amendment and the supporting argument that those powers should be exercised only when there is a significant rather than a marginal adverse impact on the regulatory objectives. That amendment referred to the important point that, as all hon. Members have said, the legal services board should have a light-touch role—a supervisory role that could be properly enshrined in the amendment. The regulatory structure proposed in the Bill cannot work unless the presumption is that the approved regulators carry out their responsibilities diligently and competently in the public interest. They are entitled to expect a degree of discretion to act on their analysis of what is needed. The front-line regulators need to be distinct from the supervisory role of the legal services board. The board should not be able to exercise its powers simply because it would have reached a different decision on the matter concerned and has thus concluded that the regulatory objectives would be better served by a different decision. It is important that the board does not just second-guess the front-line regulators. It must see its role as an important supervisory one that should involve intervention only when it judges that there has been a significant adverse impact. Further to the issue of independence, I look forward to the Minister’s opinion on whether the undertaking given to the other place about the power of the Lord Chancellor to increase the size of the board, which could affect the decisions that are made, could give an impression of manipulation. Will there be an undertaking that the powers to increase the size of the board will be achieved by affirmative resolution rather than negative resolution?