Legal Services Bill [Lords]

My hon. Friend makes the point clearly. I agree that he outlines a concern. We should not trifle with the legal profession’s independence, which is as important as the consumer interest. They are both important principles, which need to be respected. Indeed, the Government have accepted that because they included the public as well as the consumer interest in the Bill. That was the right decision, but further work remains to be done. The other place made changes to the ground on which the board could take action against an approved front-line regulator and to clarify that the board is to act only as a supervisory regulator. The Under-Secretary said that she wanted to refine that. Does she mean a drafting change or a substantive change to what was agreed in the other place? Perhaps the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, the hon. and learned Member for Redcar, could comment on the matter in her winding-up speech. If the regulator is only supervisory and acts as a backstop, that is clearly what Clementi proposed and what we all expect. However, if the Under-Secretary intends to change the Lords proposal, it is important to know the exact reason for that because the protection is important. The Lords tried to raise the threshold for intervention by the board and constrain the powers of direction and public censure so that the regulation was lighter touch, not heavy handed. The Under-Secretary says that she wishes to overturn those changes, but does not she agree that the Clementi model is that of a supervisory regulator and that the provisions will set the tone for whether regulation is light touch or heavy handed? I understand that she has examined various ways in which to suggest appropriate intervention and I welcome her proposal to reconsider ensuring that the oversight nature of the board is included in the Bill. May I invite her to continue in Committee the search for the right words to describe the threshold for intervention? Heavy-handed regulation is in no one’s interests—I know that she agrees. In a similar spirit, the Government successfully tabled amendments to limit the circumstances in which the board could exercise its power to fine. They responded positively to protecting and promoting the public interest in the regulatory objectives. Limits were placed on the discretion of the office for legal complaints, and that is welcome. However, the other place made a change to provide that charges for the complaints process should not be levied when the complaint was unfounded and the matter was handled properly in-house. I understand that the Under-Secretary proposes to abandon the principle that the innocent do not pay for a complaint against them and that the polluter pays. I find that surprising given that she said that she agreed with the thinking behind the amendment in the other place. Surely there is a compromise to be found there: if she agrees with us, surely we can find words to express that agreement. Lord King also persuaded their lordships of the need to delegate complaints handling to an improved regulator by direction of the board. That relates, of course, to the highly regarded Bar standards board. It is well known that the Bar is tough on those who transgress: it is part of the culture of the Bar, and it is good at uncovering wrong-doing, so it would be counter-productive to lose those skills under the new system. Turning to alternative business structures, the principal concern has been the threat of cherry-picking, whereby perhaps a supermarket chain or some other multiple sets up booths to deal with some small aspects—the profitable aspects—of legal services, as a result of which the wider service provided by high-street solicitors and law centres will be lost, widening the legal advice deserts and making life much more difficult for individuals seeking legal advice, particularly the most vulnerable. An amendment was passed in the other place whereby the licensor has to make an investigation of the access to justice implications when determining an application to become an alternative business. If the Minister accepts that that is a vital issue—that is what she said—and if she is happy that her proposals will not damage access to justice, why does she object to the amendment? She seems determined to reverse something that simply provides for what she claims to want, so perhaps she can find some way of squaring that circle, too. One thing is for sure: it is not in the interest of consumers to lose access to justice. A supermarket providing some small legal service is all well and good, but if people want to talk about family law problems or other matters of legal concern, they will have to travel literally tens of miles. Finally, the Bill will transform the way in which legal services are provided. We consider the Bill to be broadly satisfactory in its current form. We would be alarmed, however, if the Government chose to try to undo all the good work that was done in the other place. There is substantial consensus over this Bill and the changes made reflect the spirit of Clementi and do not conflict with it, so there is no issue of principle between us. The Joint Committee noted that the public interest and the consumer interest do not always equate, particularly in matters of law, and it is good that the Bill now reflects both interests and that the Government have agreed that it should do so. Although it is vital for consumers to be able to remedy wrongs done to them by lawyers, it is also important that they have access to lawyers who are independent of the Government so that they can pursue the Government for the wrongs that they do. There is therefore no conflict between protecting the consumer and protecting the independence of lawyers. A fair and just system works to the benefit of all. Indeed, it is very much in the public interest. We believe that it is vital to consumers to protect access to justice. Legal services are sometimes commercial in nature, but they often amount to an important part of the welfare state. We look forward to examining the Bill further in Committee. We see some room for compromise and further reflection, and we will want to raise a range of issues. One issue is whether there should be some regulation for will writers. As the Minister knows, that is a classic area for burying one’s mistakes because problems often come to light after the death of the person who made the will. Some standards should be set, but I am not suggesting that only solicitors should be able to write wills. In some ways, this area falls into the same category as claims handlers, so perhaps the Minister will consider whether similar provisions should apply. At this stage, and taking account of the current state of the Bill, we see no reason to divide the House, but I want to make it clear to the Government that if they abandon a co-operative approach and attempt simply to reverse the Lords’ improvements, our attitude will change.