Serious Crime Bill [HL]

My Lords, I am afraid that I must resist these amendments to the Bill, but I hope that in so doing I will be able to persuade the noble Baroness that her concern about the issue is not as well founded as she may fear. The amendments would place restrictions so that HMRC cannot apply to intercept communications, or authorise intrusive surveillance, in the interests of national security or for the purpose of safeguarding the economic well-being of the United Kingdom. As the noble Baroness knows, under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, intercepting communications and intrusive surveillance is subject to stringent safeguards and controls and is possible only where it is necessary to prevent or detect serious crime, in the interests of national security or for the purpose of safeguarding the economic well-being of the United Kingdom. I am grateful to her for highlighting her understanding of that and setting out what we debated on the last occasion. However, national security and the economic well-being of the UK are mentioned in the Act as these powers are available to a number of law enforcement and security agencies, some of which may need to use the powers for those purposes. I understand that she is saying ““I'm not talking about them, I am just looking at HMRC””. Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs applies to use these powers only for the purpose of preventing or detecting serious crime, not in the interests of national security or for the purposes of safeguarding the economic well-being of the United Kingdom. I was trying to make a distinction about the different roles that the different bodies would seek to take in applying those powers. Safeguarding the economic well-being and national security are not part of the statutory functions of that department and noble Lords may know that it is unlawful for an agency to act outside its statutory functions, so an application would be both inappropriate and unsuccessful. In particular, the purpose of protecting the economic well-being of the UK is concerned with matters relating to national security and this was discussed when the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 was debated. The link between national security and the economic well-being of the United Kingdom is also recognised and reinforced by the code of practice on the interception of communications. As the noble Baroness has identified, that code of practice states that the Secretary of State will not issue an interception warrant unless a direct link between the economic well-being of the United Kingdom and national security is established. In addition, the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act ensures that an authority to intercept communications can be granted as necessary only in the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom where the information which it is thought necessary to obtain relates to the acts or intentions of persons outside the British Isles. That is set out at Section 5(5) of RIPA. Amendment No. 121 may also have drafting errors. It would insert new subsection (3A) into Section 32 of RIPA, but there is already a subsection (3A) that was inserted by the Enterprise Act 2002. If it gives comfort to the noble Baroness, I am always grateful for having officials who will trawl through the minutiae to stop me entering into error and I understand the noble Baroness's acuity in looking at these issues and that she may not necessarily have the number of people to support her in that regard. In addition, the amendment refers to paragraph (m) of subsection (5) of that Section, but that paragraph does not exist so the legislation would become difficult to interpret and operate. The amendment is possibly intended to refer to paragraph (m) of subsection (6) of Section 32 of RIPA. Amendments Nos. 120 and 121 are unnecessary as Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs can apply to use these powers only for the purpose of preventing or detecting serious crime and not for protecting the economic well-being of the UK or in the interests of national security. I therefore assure the noble Baroness and the House that the situation will not be altered by Schedule 11. In addition, the amendments would complicate what is already complex legislation and could make it more difficult to interpret and apply. For these reasons, I must resist them. The noble Baroness was in essence asking how we can be sure that HMRC officers will use these powers appropriately and will not misuse them. The training provided to HMRC staff who are investigating serious tax crime, and the stringent safeguards and procedures that come with these powers, will ensure that they are used appropriately. The procedures ensure that any possible use of one of these powers is subject to strict internal scrutiny before an application can even be made for their use. The powers are used only where other methods of investigation have failed or would clearly not succeed in obtaining the evidence or intelligence being sought. Many of the powers require independent external authorisation before they can be used; for example, a warrant must be obtained from the Secretary of State before communications can be intercepted. The use of all these powers is also subject to regular, independent external inspection to ensure that officers use them appropriately. We have spoken in the past about the procedures that we have followed in authorising interceptions. Therefore, I hope that the noble Baroness will see that, although I share her concern about getting this right and I understand her fear of the possibility of one issue bleeding into the other in a way that we would both regard as wrong, we have structured the Bill in a realistic way which prevents that happening. Having given the noble Baroness that assurance, I hope that she will feel able to withdraw her amendments.