Greater London Authority Bill

I am slightly unclear about the point that has just been made about pre-emption, not because I do not understand it, but because I am not quite clear what the noble Baroness, Lady Hanham, has moved. This seems to me to go to the heart of what I suspect will be a series of debates that we will have during the course of the Committee and in due course in later stages of the Bill about the balance of power between the Assembly and the Mayor. Essentially, as I understand the amendments in this group, and Amendment No. 13, which is not grouped, they would give the Assembly a power by a majority vote not to approve a particular nominee. That may or may not be an admirable solution, but it is one that changes the nature of the mayoralty system. The whole structure of the Greater London Authority Act has been devised as a ““strong mayor model””—to use the academic jargon—of a fairly weak Assembly but with some powers. The amendments tabled at various stages shift from a two-thirds majority to a simple majority the powers of the Assembly, while this one introduces a new power for the Assembly with a simple majority. I suspect that they will raise some really big issues about how we see the relationship between the Mayor and the Assembly. One could devise a perfectly acceptable mayoral model with a different balance between the Mayor and the Assembly. What you cannot do, without a radical look at every single aspect of the Greater London Authority Act, is change some aspects of it by giving the Assembly greater powers to act with a simple majority, as opposed to the enhanced majority which already exists for the budget. I am sympathetic to the idea of having confirmation hearings with the possibility of the Assembly doing more than simply saying, ““We do not recommend this appointment””, or, ““We do recommend this appointment””. However, if it is to be consistent with the rest of the Greater London Authority Act, with a strong mayoral model, it should be on the basis of a qualified majority of perhaps two-thirds voting not to approve a particular nomination. If you go down the route of saying that there can be a vote by a simple majority, you are essentially undermining the power of the Mayor and his ability to act in the way envisaged in the rest of the legislation. For those who say that confirmation hearings would have no relevance unless there is a power to reject, I would argue that the significance of the Assembly, even by a simple majority, recommending to the Mayor that an appointment should not proceed, will be very damaging to the authority of nominees. It is not something that I hope the Assembly would do lightly, but it is something where the nominee would want to consider very carefully his position. He may feel that the Assembly was acting on a party-political spasm whereby two parties combine to create a majority, or whatever the numbers would require, and therefore that it was not relevant. However, it is clearly something that they would consider. The power as currently envisaged in the Bill, whereby confirmation hearings would take place and the Assembly would either support the nomination or recommend to the Mayor that it should not be proceeded with, but the Mayor would still have the power to continue, puts a significant constraint on the power. It is a significant constraint on the individuals because they would be made to think again if the Assembly says, ““You are not acceptable to us””, but it does not alter the fundamental constitutional relationship between the Mayor and the Assembly. If we agree these amendments, we will alter the fundamental constitutional arrangement, and that would require a rethink of the whole GLA Act.