Legal Services Bill [HL]

My Lords, we on these Benches agree with the noble Lord, Lord Kingsland, that Clause 30 imposes too light a trigger on the exercise of what, on the face of it, are draconian powers that could lead to an approved regulator ceasing to be so approved. The concept of compatibility with the regulatory objectives as a whole is recognised as an holistic, inclusive concept in Clause 3. We believe that that concept should be in Clause 30. Indeed, it is plain common sense that there should be this inclusive view of what Clause 3 calls, "““compatible with the regulatory objectives?." One can think of many examples in which there could be conflict between some of the regulatory objectives set out in Clause 1(1) but not with the regulatory objectives as a whole. A simple example of this is, "““protecting and promoting the interests of consumers?," in Clause 1(1)(c). There may be very good reasons for a professional body saying that no lawyer should conduct a clinical negligence case unless that lawyer has some training and experience in conducting those cases. However, part of the regulatory objectives in Clause 1(1)(d) is to promote, "““competition in the provision of services within subsection (2)?." My understanding is that in north Wales, for example, only one solicitor—there may be more now, but certainly a few months ago there was only one—had the approval to carry out clinical negligence cases and so receive funding from the Legal Services Commission. There is plainly a conflict between competition and a decision that only people who are really competent to do certain types of cases should do them. The provisions we are considering could be triggered not by the consideration of those two regulatory objectives together but by one of them alone without considering the other. It seems a matter of practical common sense that the approach taken in Clause 3(2)(a) should be consistently applied throughout the Bill.