Legal Services Bill [HL]

moved AmendmentNo. 5: 5: Clause 1 , page 2, line 1, at end insert— ““( ) In implementation of this Act the balance as between each and all regulatory objectives shall be determined by reasoned decision: notice of which shall have been given to afford objection by those to whom it would have been addressed.”” The noble Lord said: My Lords, AmendmentNo. 5 is not a matter of substantive law. Again, it is a procedural provision of generic application to the decisions of all three regulatory bodies set up by statute in implementation of this Act. I pay tribute to the contribution of the noble Viscount, Lord Bledisloe, who dealt with a disparity in a speech which no one sought to contradict. This is an overarching provision of principle. The object is to safeguard due and fair administration in accordance with the balance of the regulatory objectives. As a procedural provision, compliance with the amendment would be subject to judicial review. There is no doubt about that. This was established in the landmark decision of the Courtof Appeal in the Queen and the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal. It was a complex decision, the official transcript of which exceeds 40 pages, which I have read and is available in the Library. However, the reasoning of the decision that judicial review remains in these circumstances under the aegis of the High Court is well presented in a very short and readable Times law report on 11 April. There are three aspects of this amendment. Put simply, the first aspect is the balance of regulatory objectives when making a decision, which I picked up from my noble friend Lord Kingsland who convinced me that that was the right approach. This is the right approach because regulatory objectives compete and conflict. The second aspect is a reasoned decision. It is absolutely essential that the decision, not just of the board but of all regulatory bodies set up by statute, should be reasoned. The third aspect is the giving of notice of a decision to afford objection, which has arisen in other aspects recently; notably, on the defence bill. Provision for this, which is a reflection of a rudimentary requirement of natural justice, is made only in Schedule 7 and is solely related to directions of the board under Clause 31. However, it is not treated anywhere in the Bill as a principle of general application. These are predominantly lay regulatory bodies. There is nothing unusual in that, but inevitably they will have to deal with matters of law, and this amendment would in all events narrow the scope of contention and judicial review which now retains jurisdiction over the proportionality of a decision. As a matter of general principle, this should be included in Clause 1. This amendment is in the interests not only of the customer, but also the legal profession in establishing confidence. It would afford due and fair administration and is wholly consistent with the soft touch of the Clementi approach. The need for it became apparent during the debate in Committee. I think I even suggested that we were in a bit of a muddle and that there might be a trigger in the statute to introduce a code of practice, which was not a good idea, but no one had any conclusive suggestions. So an amendment such as this is requisite. I doubt whether it is in the right form because I am not an expert draftsman, but nonetheless in principle I commend it to your Lordships. I beg to move.