Serious Crime Bill [HL]

I will respond first to the amendments. I notice with hurt surprise the repetition of ““suspects”” rather than ““citizens””. I do not chide the noble Baroness in that regard, but it would be an unfortunate way to view such people because, as she would wish, we seek to justify the provisions on the basis that they are a proportionate use of the data. We will resist the amendments, but I hope that I will be able to explain why. I may take a little time doing that, because we need to sort it out at this stage if we can. Amendment No. 104A seeks to prohibit the sharing of personal information as defined inSection 1 of the Data Protection Act, where it pertains to a person whom the public authority does not suspect of involvement in fraud. I am a little surprised by that, because we accept that fraud exists and is suffered in almost endemic proportions by both the public and private sectors, as the noble Baroness alluded to. To prohibit the sharing of information where there is no suspicion of fraud will devalue the worth of the data-sharing power. The amendment would prevent public authorities being able to check new and seemingly honest applications for services against the list of known or confirmed fraudsters held by an anti-fraud organisation. As I tried to say earlier, that would provide successful fraudsters with an opportunity time and again to exploit services, in the knowledge that their application would be assumed honest. I very much bear in mind the personal example that the noble Baroness gave earlier about the proper and vigorous attempts that I am sure she made to prevent this happening in her time. The amendment would raise the threshold so high as to make the clause incapable of being used to prevent fraud, which causes huge losses to the public purse. Amendment No. 111A is about the provision of data by the mandatory bodies in Schedule 6. Specifically, it seeks to incorporate a new subsection that states that nothing in the provision authorises the disclosure of data in breach of the Data Protection Act or the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act. That would mirror new Section 32C(3), which governs the disclosure of information by voluntary bodies. In addition, the noble Baroness seeks that personal data should not be provided to the commission by either mandatory or voluntary bodies, unless the supplying public authority suspects those individuals of being involved in fraud. I gently suggest that the amendment is inappropriate and would seriously undermine the workings of the clause. First, it is not appropriate to mirror new Section 32C(3) in new Section 32B. New Section 32C(3) is effectively a saving provision designed to ensure that the Data Protection Act and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act continue to apply where data are shared on a voluntary basis. We need that because new Section 32C lifts the statutory bars that would otherwise prevent bodies contributing their data to the commission for the purposes of data matching. We therefore need to make specific provision to preserve the applicability of those two Acts, and to ensure that the key safeguards remain in place. By contrast, new Section 32B does not lift any statutory bars, and the Data Protection Act and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act will already apply where the commission is obtaining data using its mandatory powers. In other words, one does not need to put back what has not been taken away. Amendment No. 112A is the proposal that personal data should be provided only for data matching where the public body suspects the individuals of fraud. If bodies already suspect individuals of fraud, they will not need to participate in data-matching exercises at all, as they will already be at the stage where they will need to investigate further. Bodies already do that for themselves without the need for the Audit Commission to be involved. I reiterate that data matching does not identify fraudsters per se; it simply identifies anomalies in data that warrant further investigation by the relevant body supplying the data, a point touched on by the noble Lord. If we do not allow that to happen, a valuable tool with a proven track record in the fight against fraud will be lost. Two ancillary points should be made in relation to this amendment. The first is that it is inconsistent with the proposed changes to the data-matching purposes, which would require the detection of actual or attempted fraud. If that were the case, it would surely not be sufficient for a body merely to suspect that a person had been involved in fraud before it provided its data to the commission. In any event, as I hope I have explained, data matching can add little where a body either already knows or suspects an individual of fraud. The second point relates to the drafting of the amendment. It will not only be public bodies participating on a voluntary basis, and inserting the provision into new Section 32C would mean that public sector bodies alone would be subject to the restrictions, without their private sector counterparts. I do not believe that that is what the noble Baroness intends. I turn to the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord James of Blackheath, in relation to the Stock Exchange. Only members of the specified anti-fraud organisations can share information. If both the London Stock Exchange and, for instance, the noble Lord were members, they could share information via the specified organisation, but would not be obliged to do so. I see that it is one minute before half-past seven, so I will be happy to write to him further in that regard if it will further assist him.