Serious Crime Bill [HL]

The noble Baroness should not apologise at all in relation to these issues, because they are not easy. We need to go through them slowly to see how they fit in. I hope I will be able to help. I do not know if there is a suggestion that we should merge the two stand-part debates, but I shall give the short answer, and then if the Committee feels that more explanation over and above the discussions we have already had about the specific issues would be helpful, I will be happy to provide it. The difference between Clauses 40 and 41, to come to the point of the noble Lords, Lord Henley and Lord Dholakia, is answered by the noble Baroness, Lady Carnegy of Lour, in her normal insightful way. Clause 40 deals with a person who believes that a specific offence will be committed, while Clause 41 deals with a person who believes that an offence will be committed but is not sure which. As such, the latter clause operates in a different way and needs to be dealt with separately. For instance, you could have a situation where an individual believes that the offence of murder is likely to be committed, and that is the only reasonable offence within contemplation. The evidence therefore points towards a Clause 40 offence. However, there could be a situation where the belief is that one of a number of offences might be committed by an individual. For example, it may be that someone who rents out a property to an individual whom they know or believe to be a paedophile believes that an act of abuse may occur in those premises with a child of tender years, but they do not know which act it may be; it may a sexual assault, a physical assault, an attempt at murder or a murder. It is impossible to say with any precision which of those offences the person believes will happen, but they believe that one of them will happen. The Clause 41 offence is there for when there is a belief that one of a number of offences might be committed but there is no clarity in the individual’s own mind as to which it is most likelyto be. I hope that explanation assists, because one then sees why in Clause 41(1)(b), which we will deal with if we have another stand-part debate, the belief is set out separately. That allows for a situation where the defendant believes that one offence or more will be committed but there is no belief as to which, and there is a belief that the act will encourage or assist the commission of one or more of them. It is important, if we are separating them out, to say that in Clause 39 there is clear intention, in Clause 40 there is a belief of a specific offence, and in Clause 41 there is a belief that one of a number of offences may be committed and that the act or acts will encourage or assist the commission of one or more of them. That enables the defendant to know more clearly what is alleged against him and the court to deal with it more easily. I am very happy to explain more fully the argumentation that came out of the Law Commission on this regard if it helps and to give some more examples for Clauses 40 and 41, if that will assist the Committee further. In part, we are trying to get on the record how we see these offences because others who read this debate will find that of interest. So I am very happy to give a fuller response if the Committee feels that would assist.