Fraud (Trials without a Jury) Bill

My Lords, the noble and learned Lord the Attorney-General began by indicating that the procedures followed in this debate are somewhat unusual. He is entirely right; but I am bound to say that we entirely agree with the reasons advanced by the noble Lord, Lord Kingsland, for treating this measure in the way that he has done. It is not a new matter of substance; I recall participating in another place in a debate on the Roskill committee report in which many of the arguments advanced by the noble and learned Lord the Attorney-General were deployed. The remarkable difference, however, has been the unwillingness of our present Government to respond to the objections to their proposals. The previous debate was led by Douglas Hurd, now the noble Lord, Lord Hurd of Westwell, who listened to the views of another place. Of those who spoke in the debate, 11 out of 12 Members spoke against the proposal that the Attorney-General seeks to advocate today. Unsurprisingly, the measure was withdrawn in the form currently being advanced. It is remarkable how little the arguments have changed in 21 years, but in one respect the general legal ethos has changed. There have been disturbing indications from the Government that they do not cleave to the foundations of our freedoms, our rule of law and justice without cavil to the extent of their predecessors. We have seen measures that have called into question habeas corpus and the rules about the burden of proof in criminal trials. The Attorney-General may not like it, and he may shake his head, but the reality is that this country needs to beware of measures that undermine one of the fundamental rights of the citizens in this country—the jury trial, which they perceive to be a guarantee of their freedoms. No doubt the Attorney-General is aware of the recent inquiries by the legal professions in England on the attitude of the public to jury trial. Eighty per cent of those who gave evidence thought that juries would be much more likely to adhere to their views than judges would. There was far greater confidence in juries than in judges. That does not reflect an understanding of the very great distinction of our judicial profession, but it sounds a warning against the limitations on the jury system that this measure seeks to introduce. One point made in the minority report on Roskill, which I thought telling at the time, was whenMr Merrick said that legislators ought to bear in mind, "““the public incomprehension which would follow in denying the right to a trial by jury to a man who has stolen £1 million by the use of a computer and allowing it to a man who has stolen£1 million from a bank by the use of a gun””.—[Official Report, Commons, 13/2/98; col. 1167.]" It is hard to understand precisely what motivates the Government to persist with this legislation in the face of the grave anxieties expressed in another place, by the legal profession, bodies such as Liberty, JUSTICE and the Law Society, and many who have had direct experience of the conduct of fraud cases. What lies behind it? It is hard to tell from the views expressedin another place by the Solicitor-General. When pressed, he said that, "““shorter trials, however desirable, are not our primary objective. We want to enable justice to be done by exposing the whole criminality of the case in a single trial. If trials are short, that will be a bonus””.—[Official Report, Commons, 29/11/06; col. 1101.]" It is not the length of the case that leads to this radical measure; length is apparently incidental to the Government’s motives. In any event, on the length issue—it was ably dealt with by the noble Lord, Lord Kingsland—the procedures provided for in the measure would enable the defendant to take matters on appeal from the judge, including the reference to provide for a trial without a jury. On the face of it, it seems highly likely that the appeal process would extend trials beyond the time acknowledged, in relatively few cases, to be very burdensome. The complexity of trials from the point of view of the juries has been dealt with by the noble Lord, Lord Kingsland, who properly pointed to the findingsin respect of the Jubilee Line trial and the comprehension of the jurors of the issues at stake. It is proper to remind ourselves that the concerns expressed in that review by the independent inspector were about the management of the case, which appears to be what underlies the complexity. Here again, there is ambivalence on the part of the Government and the noble and learned Lord the Attorney-General. When he talks, as he did, about bringing all the issues together in one trial, I wonder exactly what he has in mind. Is that in the interests of justice? Is it necessary to make the case more complex to cover all the issues that might be raised? It certainly was not necessary, when Dr Shipman was being tried for murder, to bring into the case all the possible cases in which he might have committed murder. It was possible to convict him on the evidence of a number of cases, but to obtain a conviction and an exemplary sentence appropriate for the seriousness of the crime it was not necessary for the case to be comprehensive in the way in which the noble and learned Lord the Attorney-General seemed to suggest that fraud cases should be. The noble and learned Lord the Attorney-General has brandished the threat of the Parliament Act. I am bound to say that that does not make it more attractive to me to see this Bill continued beyond today. It suggests deep commitment, for whatever reason—I find it difficult to divine the reason, other than a degree of stubbornness—that would render the noble and learned Lord the Attorney-General opposed to any amendment that might be advanced. It was clear from the way in which amendments were dismissed in another place that the Government are not open on these issues. They have set their face firmly in one direction and they intend to travel down that route until they arrive. The question that might properly be asked is: why have the Government shown so little confidence in the measures that they themselves introduced to deal with some of these problems? Why are they not prepared to wait to see the effect of the Fraud Act, which only came into effect in January? Why are they not prepared to consider whether the amendment by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Justice Woolf, to the criminal procedure rules and the protocol for the control and management of serious fraud and other complex cases deliver the objectives that, on the face of it, they seem concerned about? Why are these measures being written off as not as important as tampering with the jury system? The noble and learned Lord the Attorney-General stated that they are not enough, but he has no evidence of that; he has no evidence at all, because they have not been in effect for long enough to draw conclusions. There is another matter, again relating to the Government’s own legislation. The Attorney-General spoke about the all-embracing nature of the charge and the inclusiveness of the trial, making sure that every point is considered. That was not the motivation behind the introduction of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004, which provides for trial by jury of sample counts only, if certain conditions are fulfilled, with the remaining counts to be tried by a judge alone. Whether that Act leads to differences is worthy of consideration. It might tell us something about the possible effect of the measure before us. Despite the fact that these matters have been considered and debated for 21 years, the Attorney-General’s action appears, in the light of what has been done in the past two or three years, precipitate and careless of our fundamental rights and freedoms. I therefore hope that a stop will be brought to this legislation today and that the public will have an opportunity to consider the issues and why this House is proposing to take this action.