Serious Crime Bill [HL]

moved Amendment No. 16: 16: Clause 2 , page 2, line 33, leave out paragraph (b) The noble Baroness said: In speaking to this amendment, I shall also speak to Amendments Nos. 25, 30 and 39, which are grouped with it. The Government’s rhetoric surrounding the Bill has spoken of the new tough measures regarding people involved in serious crime, so it is important to examine whether these measures will indeed target what would be commonly thought of as serious crime, or whether it misses that target and adopts a scattergun approach across a wide range of offences that would not normally be considered serious. We have tabled a series of amendments to examine different aspects of that question. They fall into different groups, some of which I anticipate will be debated upon another occasion but not tonight. The first group challenges the Government’s proposition that the definition of serious crime can be changed on a day-to-day, case-by-case basis by the courts. That seems extraordinary. There was some small reference to this earlier today, but these amendments address the detail of the matter. Schedule 1 lists a range of criminal offences that are to be treated as serious crime. In a later group we shall examine whether that list is in itself appropriate, when we reach Amendment No. 49. What concerns us in this group of amendments is the fact that the Bill provides that a serious offence includes any that, in the particular circumstances of the case, the court considers to be sufficiently serious to be treated for the purposes of the application or matter as if it were so specified. So even if an offence is not listed in Schedule 1, a judge can treat it as if it were. I join with the Minister in her remarks earlier today; I am on record too as having great faith in our judiciary. Of course I do. I have previously declared my interest, that I am married to a barrister who sits as a part-time recorder in the Crown Court. The Minister’s effusive remarks were on the calibre of the High Court judges and the way they were going to make these decisions, and I also, of course, admire those in the Crown Court. Despite all that, however, I can set that partiality aside; it does not mean I am content with the proposition that there should be so little clarity and certainty in the law before us that we should leave it to the judge to determine case by case, on the matter of the moment, what should be construed as serious crime within the context of the applications for a serious crime prevention order. In theory, that means any offence could be construed as serious, such as graffiti, or minor criminal damage to a neighbour’s fence. Despite what the Minister said when she responded to Amendment No. 2 earlier today about the ability of High Court judges to construe what is serious crime, the problem is that, however able they are, by giving them that power in the context of these orders, we simply lose clarity and certainty in the law. The Explanatory Notes are silent on the Government’s justification for such a wide-ranging discretion in the hands of the court. The Government’s proposals do damage to the principle of legal certainty. We seek to remove that uncertainty. Our amendment would ensure that an offence was only a serious offence if it was actually listed in Schedule 1. I beg to move.