Docking of Working Dogs’ Tails (England) Regulations 2007

I declare my interest as an honorary associate of both the Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons and the British Veterinary Association. I have been, but am not currently, an owner of working dogs. I am speaking only to the Docking of Working Dogs’ Tails (England) Regulations 2007. The Minister cannot but be aware of the enormous reservations held by the Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons, the RSPCA, the Kennel Club and many others to the continued permitting of tail docking for specified types of dogs, generally called working dogs. It is of passing interest to recall why working dogs’ tails were docked in the first place. It was not on welfare grounds, as is so frequently cited; it was because one of the 17th or 18th century kings—I cannot recall who—finding himself a little short of cash to pursue his wars or his pleasures, decided to impose a tax on pet dogs. To distinguish taxpaying pet dogs from non-taxpaying working dogs, the tails of the latter were docked. Most of the objections to this statutory instrument are on grounds of policy, but a possible drafting defect has been brought to my attention by the royal college. Regulation 3(1) is not in accordance with Section 6 of the Animal Welfare Act 2006. Section 6(5) provides for the veterinary surgeon to certify that certain evidence has been produced to show that the dog is likely to work, and Section 6(6) requires the vet to certify that the dog is a prescribed type. By contrast, Regulation 3(l) calls on the veterinary surgeon to certify that evidence has been produced not only of the dog’s future employment, but of its type. This is a question of drafting. On matters that relate rather more to policy than to drafting, relevant identification must be produced for dogs that are meant to be used for work by the Armed Forces, the emergency rescue service, the police, the Prison Service or HMRC. Regulation 2 says that such identification must show that the person producing it belongs to a relevant organisation. There is, however, nothing in the regulations to connect that person with the dog or its owner. Therefore, a person who wants a dog’s tail docked needs only to persuade a friendly soldier, police officer, or whomever to go with him to see the veterinary surgeon and produce identification. The regulations omit to say that the person producing the identification must also be the person asking for the dog’s tail to be docked. Neither the veterinary surgeon nor the client has to specify what kind of work the dog is expected to do, or what kind of evidence must be produced. This will create an unnecessary obstacle to enforcement. Although the evidence produced would show that it would be for work, it would do nothing to substantiate in what capacity. Evidence might link it to relevant organisations, but not show its role within them. There is no specification as to what evidence a dog destined for pest control would need. The certificate which the veterinary surgeon and the client are required to sign should make it clear what the story is in order to make it possible for the police, or the Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons in its disciplinary capacity, to make a clear-cut decision as to whether there is evidence of bad faith. This lacuna is easily remedied by requiring the veterinary surgeon to indicate what evidence has been produced and the client to specify the activity for which the dog is expected to be used. The definition of specified types of dog in Schedule 1 is drawn far too widely. For example, Labradors are retrievers. So far as I know, they have never been candidates for tail docking. Sadie, recently awarded the Dicken medal for her services to Her Majesty’s Armed Forces in Afghanistan, is a Labrador retriever. How would she look without her tail? Should not the distinction be drawn between animals that have been docked traditionally and those that have not within these categories? These regulations are in direct conflict with those in Scotland, where there is a total ban on tail docking. This may well create some cross-border conflicts—my ancestors knew all about those—between veterinary surgeons and their one-off potential clients, as well as with the Scottish authorities. It seems that there might also be conflict with the Welsh when they finally decide what they want to do. I cannot understand why anyone would want to dock the tail of any dog. Anyone who has seen a pointer—one of the specified types of dog—working and pointing with its tail, or a spaniel that has found what it has been sent to find, cannot help but wonder at the efficiency and the aesthetic beauty of their signalling systems. The police or Armed Forces might say that removing the tail reduces the sites on an animal’s body where an offender can obtain a purchase. In my youth in Kenya during the Mau Mau troubles, the police and soldiers had Dobermans as working dogs. As well as being docked very short, these dogs had their ears amputated and, when working, were smothered in lard. I suspect that these extremely fierce creatures were no more effective than they would have been if they had all their bits and pieces intact. For any law to be effective, it must be clear, reasonable and enforceable. There have been many debates on the reasonableness of the proposals for docking dogs’ tails, and I do not intend to go any further on that point. I have indicated a few of the areas where I believe these regulations are either defectively drafted or unclear. Their lack of clarity will mean that this part of the Animal Welfare Act 2006 will be very much like another one, whose title I hardly dare mention but which is held in contempt by some horse riders and many in our rural community and which is proving nearly impossible to enforce. I ask the Minister to withdraw the Docking of Working Dogs’ Tails (England) Regulations 2007 and to try again.